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ARTICLES
FROM INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION TO GENETIC
ENHANCEMENT: THE UNSETTLED LEGACY
OF BUCK v. BELL
ROBERTA M. BERRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some judicial decisions are so horrendously wrong that they
leave us dumbstruck on first encounter. Like survivors of natural
disasters first surveying the scene, we must struggle at first to
comprehend what has happened. Next begins the long mourn-
ing for the victims, mourning sharpened by our feelings of anger
and betrayal at injustice done by the very ones charged as our
guardians against injustice.
Eventually we turn to constructing the legacies of these deci-
sions-our shared public understanding of their wrongfulness
and our shared public commitment to preventing recurrence of
the wrongdoing. By our efforts to construct these legacies we
hope both to safeguard future generations and to win some mea-
sure of belated justice for past victims.
Although decisions of this sort are not common, they also
are not hard to find. Scott v. Sandford,1 the decision commonly
known as Dred Scott,2 is one of these decisions. Mr. Dred Scott
* J.D., Ph.D. student in the History and Philosophy of Science, University
of Notre Dame. I thank Professor Kevin McDonnell for very helpful discussion
of several issues addressed in this article, and I thank Professors John H.
Robinson and Phillip R. Sloan for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this article. All opinions expressed in this article are my own.
1. 60 U. S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. In 1834, Dr. John Emerson, an army surgeon, took Mr. Dred Scott to a
military post in Rock Island, Illinois, where slavery was illegal. In 1836,
Emerson took Scott to Fort Snelling in the Wisconsin Territory (now
Minnesota), where, pursuant to the Missouri Compromise, slavery was illegal.
Emerson then returned with Scott to reside again in slave states.
Scott filed suit in 1846 in the state courts of Missouri, a slave state, claiming
that he was legally free due to his transport into and residence in a free state
(Illinois) and a free territory (Wisconsin). Emerson had died and the action
was filed against his widow, Mrs. Irene Emerson. Scott's wife and children filed
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and his wife and children were African-Americans held in slavery
in ante-bellum Missouri. In 1846, Scott filed suit in Missouri state
court claiming that he was a free man due to his transport into
and residence within a free state and a free territory while in the
company of his purported owner. After losing on the merits at
the Missouri Supreme Court, Scott filed a claim in Missouri fed-
eral court in 1854. Scott lost on the merits in federal court as
well, and then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In
1857, the Supreme Court rendered its decision.
Chief Justice Roger Taney, writing for the Court, refused to
reach the merits of the case. Instead, he framed the central issue
as a jurisdictional question:
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors
were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become
a member of the political community formed and brought
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and
as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges,
and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citi-
zen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a
court of the United States in the cases specified in the
Constitution.
It will be observed, that the plea applies to that class of
persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the African
race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as
slaves. The only matter in issue before the court, there-
fore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when they
shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had
become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in
parallel claims for freedom. Scott and his family won their freedom in a St.
Louis court in 1850, but the decision was reversed by the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1852.
Scott then filed suit in federal court in Missouri in 1854. By this time, Mrs.
Emerson's brother, Mr. John F. A. Sanford, a citizen of New York, was
defending the case on her behalf. The court reporter for the U.S. Supreme
Court misspelled his name-Sandford, hence the title of the case. The basis for
jurisdiction was Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 1 of the U.S. Constitution-so-
called "diversity" jurisdiction, which generally permits "citizens" of one state to
sue citizens of another state in federal court. The federal trial judge
determined that Scott had the right to sue in federal court, but decided against
him on the merits of the case. Scott, with the aid of lawyers committed to the
antislavery cause, pursued the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. See PAUL
FINKELMAN, DRED ScoTr v. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 2-4,
20-29, 45-50 (1997).
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the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitu-
tion of the United States.3
Taney concluded that neither Scott nor any other persons
descended from Africans held as slaves-regardless of whether
those persons were themselves free or enslaved-could be "citi-
zens" within the meaning of the Constitution for purposes of
bringing suit in federal court.4 Hence, Scott was not entided to a
review on the merits5 and had no legal recourse in pursuing his
claim for freedom.
Taney's argument to this conclusion drew heavily upon evi-
dence of the framers' intent.6 He found evidence of their intent
in various Constitutional provisions that recognized the institu-
tion of slavery, in the slaveholding practices of the framers, and
in colonial statutes treating whites and non-whites differentially.
7
But the most compelling evidence, on the account of Taney,
were the racial opinions that prevailed among white Americans
of the founding era. He wrote:
[African-Americans] had for more than a century before
[the founding] been regarded as beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
3. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403. As commentators have noted, despite
framing the issue as purely ajurisdictional question, Taney's opinion ranged far
beyond this narrow question. In the course of the opinion, he declared the
federal legislation enacting the Missouri Compromise, which prohibited slavery
in federal territories to the north and west of the borders of Missouri,
unconstitutional-the first Court decision declaring federal legislation
unconstitutional since Marbuiy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See
FINKELMAN, supra note 2, at 6-10, 36-45, 72-76. For a discussion of the Taney
Court prior to and after the Dred Scott decision, and the positions taken by the
six concurring justices and two dissenters on the various questions at issue in
the case, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAw, AND POLITICS: THE DRED
SCOTT CASE IN HIsToRIcAL PERSPECTIVE 113-243 (1981).
4. See Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403.
5. See id. at 404
6. Taney explained the interpretive task as follows:
It becomes necessary.., to determine who were citizens of the several
States when the Constitution was adopted. And in order to do this, we
must recur to the Governments and institutions of the thirteen
colonies.. ... We must inquire who, at that time, were recognised as
the people or citizens of a State ....
Id. at 407.
7. See id. at 407-27. Taney also drew upon the text of the Constitution and
of other founding documents. For an analysis and a telling critique of Taney's
arguments, see FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 187-99.
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respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit.8
The racial opinions invoked by Taney had been forged dur-
ing the founding era, in part in response to a problem of disso-
nance: while white colonials railed against British efforts to
"enslave" them and professed their belief in human freedom and
equality, they themselves held slaves.' Slaveholders concocted a
variety of justifications in an effort to resolve this dissonance.
Foremost among them was the claim of racial inferiority, a claim
commonly supported by appeal to the incipient science of
anthropology.1 °
The development of anthropological science was itself stim-
ulated in part by the practice of slaveholding. The science devel-
oped in tandem with increasing contacts between Western
Europeans and non-European peoples in the sixteenth to eight-
eenth centuries, contacts brought about through exploration,
travel, and the slave trade.1 1 Western European anthropologists
sought to impose order upon the observed variety of human
physical characteristics and cultures by classifying and, in some
cases, ranking racial groups according to purported physical and
temperamental features-with Western Europeans consistently
faring best in these classifications and rankings. 2 It was to these
classifications and rankings that many slaveholders appealed in
support of their racial opinions and their slaveholding practices.
This anthropological work, we now recognize, was distorted by
the prejudices and vanities of its practitioners and mistaken in its
claims about racial groups.
8. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
9. For discussions of attempts to justify slavery during the founding era,
see PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE
OF JEFFERSON 138-67 (1996); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK:
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TowARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 269-311, 483-511
(1969); DUNCANJ. MACLEOD, SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 61-
108, 169-82 (1974).
10. Justifications invoked practices in classical times, scriptural passages,
and economic expediency. But, in the face of antislavery campaigns that
invoked both religious principles and the political principles of the Revolution,
defenders of slavery increasingly turned to the authority of science as set forth
in the anthropological work of the day. See JORDAN, supra note 9, at 304-11;
MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 169-82.
11. See JORDAN, supra note 9, at 216-65.
12. Linnaeus purported to classify various racial groups according to
physiological and temperamental characteristics. Others purported to
construct a hierarchical "Great Chain of Being" within which various racial
groups were located according to their relatively closer proximity to the angels
or the animals. Still others attempted to blend the Linnaen and hierarchical
approaches. See id. at 217-65, 304-08; MACLEOD, supra note 9, at 169-82.
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In fact, by the time Taney authored the opinion in Dred Scott,
there were widespread doubts about the soundness of this
anthropological work and of the racial opinions that relied upon
it.'" And Taney did not purport to endorse these racial opinions;
he was careful by his locutions to distance himself from the views
of his forbears:
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opin-
ion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in
the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the
time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the
Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted.
But the public history of every European nation displays it
in a manner too plain to be mistaken.
... [The inferiority of African-Americans] was regarded as
an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one
thought of disputing, or supposed to be open for dispute;
and men in every grade and position in society daily and
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as
13. Taney wrote the opinion during an era of enormous controversy
within the discipline of ethnology, or race studies, an area of specialization that
had developed within anthropology in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Polygenist theories-claiming that racial groups were permanently
distinct kinds and always had been so-competed with monogenist theories-
claiming that all humans were members of a single kind. Polygenism was
embraced by some proslavery forces because it lent support to claims of
permanent and irreducible differences between superior and inferior races, but
was resisted by others because of its potential inconsistency with religious
understandings of creation. See THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY
THOUGHT IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH, 1830-1860 (Drew Gilpin Faust ed.,
1981); SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH (Eric L. McKitrick ed.,
1963).
The use of scientific claims in support of the proslavery movement had
become problematic by the mid-nineteenth century:
Most defenders of slavery sought to use the scientific prestige of
ethnology to enhance their position without becoming ensnared by
the difficulties it presented . . . . George Frederick Holmes, long
sympathetic to the notion of race as a major determinant of human
civilization, nevertheless advised fellow southerners that the truths of
ethnology remained "enveloped . . . in all the mist of obscurity. I
should steer a cautious middle course between the extreme views on
this subject." Edmund Ruffin found that despite great potential value,
ethnology offered "more amusement than reliable information," and
George Fitzhugh bluntly declared that if forced to choose between the
Bible and ethnology, southerners had best stick to the Holy Writ.
Drew Gilpin Faust, Introduction to THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY, supra, at 16 (cita-
tions omitted).
19981 405
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in matters of public concern, without doubting for a
moment the correctness of this opinion.1 4
But the dubiousness of these opinions would not deprive
them of their full brutal effect, on Taney's reasoning. As Taney
explained:
We think [African-Americans] . . . are not included, and
were not intended to be included, under the word "citi-
zens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of
the rights and privileges which that instrument provides
for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the
contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emanci-
pated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the
power and the Government might choose to grant them.
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the jus-
tice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The
decision of that question belonged to the political or law-
making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and
framed the Constitution."5
One of the most grievous of the many wrongs worked by the
decision in Dred Scott was the judicial sanction of a racial basis for
the imposition of constitutional disabilities upon African-Ameri-
cans. 6 Slave status, of course, was purely a contingent matter-a
status that could endure only as long as an aggressor group was
willing and able to maintain it by legally sanctioned imposition of
brute force. But racial status was another thing altogether. As a
biological matter, there was no escaping one's skin, and, as a
matter of constitutional interpretation-on Taney's account-
there was no escaping the intent of the framers, regardless of the
truth or falsity of the racial opinions that informed their intent.
Thus, the racial opinions of the framers, recited not as true but
as truly held, served as the linchpin in an argument that con-
cluded in the constitutionally mandated perpetual exclusion of
African-Americans, enslaved or free, from the national
community.
The decision rendered by Taney, with six concurrences and
two dissents, ignited a firestorm of protests in the North. News-
14. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
15. Id. at 404-05.
16. See discussions of Taney's imposition of legal disability due to race
rather than legal status as slave in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 187-99;
FINKELMAN, supra note 2, at 34-36.
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paper editorials lambasted the decision. Future presidential can-
didates Lincoln and Douglas fiercely debated its merits.17 A few
weeks after the decision, and eleven years after Scott had begun
his legal battle, the children of a former owner of Scott
purchased him and his family and then freed them. Scott died
nine months later. 8 Five years after the decision, President Lin-
coln signed the Emancipation Proclamation. 19
The decision in Dred Scott compounded the failure of the
founding generation by lending the imprimatur of the United
States Supreme Court to one of the most vicious and harmful
rationalizations of slavery and of other legal disabilities imposed
upon African-Americans-a theory of racial inferiority founded
in unsound science. Constructing the legacy of Dred Scott regard-
ing this and other aspects of the decision has been the project-
still unfinished-of several generations of Americans since.
A second example of a horrendously wrong decision is Kore-
matsu v. United States.2" In February of 1942, soon after the attack
on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Imperial Navy, President Frank-
lin Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing the Secretary
of War to declare certain parts of the United States "military
areas" from which residents could be excluded. A month later,
Congress enacted a law criminalizing disobedience of military
orders restricting residence in these military areas. 21
A series of military orders ensued, including orders directing
Japanese-American residents in specified areas to evacuate their
homes and report to assembly centers and providing for their
involuntary detention thereafter. Eventually, 110,000 men,
women, and children of Japanese descent, 70,000 of whom were
American citizens, were detained in "relocation centers" sur-
rounded by barbed wire fences and guarded by armed members
of the military. No individual determinations of disloyalty or mis-
conduct were made; the sole basis for subjection to these military
orders was Japanese ancestry.22
17. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 229-243; FINKELMAN, supra note 2,
at 2-4, 20-29, 45-50.
18. See FINKELMAN, supra note 2, at 51.
19. See id.
20. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
21. See Charles McClain, Introduction to THE MASS INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL REDRESS iX, ix (Charles McClain
ed., 1994); see generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1983).
22. See Sandra Takahata, The Case of Korematsu v. United States: Could It
Be Justified Today , in THE MASS INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE
QUEST FOR LEGAL REDRESS, supra note 21, at 235, 243-47.
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Mr. Fred Korematsu was a welder and an American citizen of
Japanese ancestry who disobeyed these military orders and suf-
fered a criminal conviction in consequence. Korematsu
appealed his conviction and lost in a decision authored by Justice
Hugo Black over three dissents. Blackjustified the orders as nec-
essary in wartime when all Americans could be called upon to
sacrifice for the sake of the greater good:
All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the
impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has
its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of
war the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of
large groups of citizens from their homes, except under
circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsis-
tent with our basic governmental institutions. But when
under conditions of modem warfare our shores are
threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger. 23
The wartime responsibilities of most American citizens
included serving in the military or contributing tax dollars to the
war effort or enduring rationing of scarce commodities needed
by the military. These responsibilities presupposed certain com-
mitments essential to citizenship: loyalty to the national commu-
nity and dedication to its preservation in time of peril. To
impose these responsibilities was to acknowledge the ties that
bind us, and to discharge these responsibilities was to honor
these ties.
But the wartime "responsibilities" of Korematsu and of other
Japanese-American citizens were quite different, on Black's
account. They were required to surrender their liberties to live
in their homes, work at their jobs, and come and go as they
pleased, and they were required to submit to physical detention
under military guard in isolation from their fellow Americans.
Only an Orwellian phrase book would include these among the
"responsibilities of citizenship." The sacrifices demanded did
not acknowledge the ties that bind citizens together and call
upon Japanese-Americans to honor them; they presumed that
Japanese-Americans lacked the commitments essential to citizen-
ship and treated them as potential enemies in our midst.
However artful his phrasing, Black realized that depriving
citizens of their liberties on the basis of ancestry posed a trouble-
some constitutional issue.2 4 At the outset of his opinion, he
declared that laws curtailing the civil rights of a group designated
23. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220-21.
24. In dissent, Justice Roberts wrote:
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in this manner must be considered "immediately suspect" and
subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" 25 Yet, in scrutinizing the laws
as applied in this case, Black perceived only the demands of
national exigency and the racially defined features of potential
enemies:
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprison-
ment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of
his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his
loyalty and good disposition towards the United States.
Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case
involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concen-
tration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the
true nature of the assembly and relocation centers-and
we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps
with all the ugly connotations that term implies-we are
dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order.
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were
presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not
excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him
or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with
the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted mil-
itary authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and
felt constrained to take proper security measures, because
they decreed that the military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segre-
gated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally,
because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of
war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-deter-
mined that they should have the power to do just this.26
And so, in Korematsu, constitutional rights that appeared inviola-
ble before the attack on Pearl Harbor evaporated under the hot
glare of wartime suspicion.27
[This] is [a] case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not
submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his
ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or
inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the
United States. . . . I need hardly labor the conclusion that
Constitutional rights have been violated.
Id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 216.
26. Id. at 223.
27. As United States Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards writes:
With one stroke, the Supreme Court abandoned what had been a
traditional constitutional commitment to the idea that guilt is
personal, and punishment premised on individual action. Accepting
1998]
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Eventually, in the 1980s, the convictions of Korematsu and
two others similarly convicted were set aside and federal legisla-
tion was enacted to provide some financial compensation to the
survivors among those who were interned during the war.28 The
wrongs done to Korematsu and tens of thousands of other Japa-
nese-Americans remain as powerful testimony to how, with light-
ning speed, our neighbors and fellow citizens can be
transformed into threatening figures, the enemy within, whose
most basic liberties are readily dispensable. We continue to
struggle, by our national commitment to embracing a multitude
of differences within a single national community and by our
jurisprudential commitment to a strong regime of constitutional
rights, to construct one part of the legacy of Korematsu.
A third example of a horrendous decision is Buck v. Bell, 9 a
1927 United States Supreme Court decision authored by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The case concerned a constitutional
challenge to a Virginia involuntary sterilization statute as applied
to a young woman named Carrie Buck. The statute authorized
the involuntary sterilization of "feebleminded" individuals who
had been institutionalized and who were determined to be the
potential parents of "unfit" offspring.
Miss Carrie Buck had been committed to the Virginia Col-
ony for the Epileptic and the Feebleminded ("Virginia Colony")
as had her mother before her. Just before her commitment Car-
rie Buck had given birth to a child out of wedlock. The record
on appeal contained evidence that Carrie Buck, her mother, and
her child were "feebleminded" and that their condition was heri-
table. Holmes, writing over one dissent, concluded that the Vir-
ginia statute was constitutional as applied in this case. He wrote:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may
call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our
in its stead a presumption of "racial guilt," the Court subordinated
both personal freedoms and national ideals to a dubious claim of
military exigency....
.... Korematsu is, without any doubt, a tragically poignant and bitter
reminder of the real suffering that may follow in the wake of judicial
default.
Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decision-
making, 1991 Wis. L. Rxv. 837, 842 (citations omitted).
28. See McClain, supra note 21, at xii (discussing the cases in which the
convictions were set aside and the federal legislation authorizing payments to
those who were interned).
29. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continu-
ing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vac-
cination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian
tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.3 °
On October 19, 1927, after her petition to the Supreme Court
for rehearing was denied, Carrie Buck was forcibly sterilized by
tubal ligation at the age of twenty-one.3 1
At the time the decision was rendered, there was good rea-
son to doubt both the findings of "feeblemindedness" and the
claims of heritability upon which the. reasoning and holding
relied. But there was no effort undertaken by any of those
involved in the case to ensure that there was a sound scientific
basis for the decision. In this disregard for the importance of the
scientific truth of the matter, the case is reminiscent of the deci-
sion in Dred Scott.
And, as in the case of Korematsu, decided fifteen years later,
the sacrifice demanded of Carrie Buck was different in kind from
the sacrifice expected of our "best citizens." Carrie Buck, her
mother, and her child were the enemy within, threatening to
swamp the rest of us with their incompetence. Carrie Buck was
not called upon to contribute her life, labor, or treasure to the
defense and sustenance of the community. Instead, she was
forced to sacrifice her capacity to bear children so that her impo-
sition upon the community would not extend beyond her lifes-
pan or spread beyond her only child.
But there surely was a third and distinct source of wrongdo-
ing in Buck v. Bell. The Court did not simply defer to the scien-
tific evidence in the case and did not merely sanction involuntary
sterilization of the "unfit" as an appropriate sacrifice of personal
liberty in service of the greater good. Beyond this, the 'Court
wholeheartedly embraced a coercive, governmentally sanctioned
program of eugenics-the assertion of control over human
reproduction in service of the evolutionary improvement of the
human race-of which this legislative effort in Virginia was but a
part.
In constructing the legacy of Buck v. Bell, commentators have
focused upon these three sources of wrongfulness-reliance
upon unsound science, intrusion upon reproductive liberty, and
30. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
31. SeeJ. DAVID SMITH & K. RAY NELSON, THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE
BUCK xviii (1989).
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the endorsement of a coercive governmental program of eugen-
ics-in attempting to articulate our shared public understanding
of its wrongfulness. And they have recommended corresponding
commitments to guard against recurrence of the wrongdoing:
procedures and standards to assure careful scrutiny of "scientific"
claims in governmental fora;3 2 a steadfast commitment to a
regime of constitutionally protected reproductive rights;3" and
rejection of any sort of governmental program of eugenics. 4 In
fact, at first blush, the legacy of Buck v. Bell would appear to be
quite settled.
But, as I hope to show in this article, the legacy of Buck v. Bell
remains a work in progress. It remains so, first, because examina-
tion of these three sources of wrongfulness reveals questions and
perplexities in our public understanding of the case-we have
not yet constructed a clear and coherent account of these three
sources of wrongfulness. And, second, reflection upon the leg-
acy as we have constructed it to date leaves us with a sense of
residual wrongfulness as yet unexplored. I pursue this sense in
an effort to excavate an additional source of wrongfulness in the
case.
I begin, in Part II, below, with a fuller examination of the
case in historical context. In Part III, I assess the construction of
its legacy to date, and, in Part IV, I work to extend our public
understanding of the wrongfulness of the case. In Part V, I con-
sider the implications of this extended public understanding for
the potential future application of scientific knowledge and
know-how to "enhance" our children by genetic engineering.
II. THE COMMITMENT AND STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK
Carrie Buck was born into poverty in Albemarle County, Vir-
ginia in 1906. Shortly thereafter, her father either abandoned
the family or was killed in an accident, and her mother, Mrs.
Emma Buck, struggled to provide for the family, reputedly work-
ing as a prostitute. Three-year-old Carrie was taken from her
mother and placed in the care of foster parents, Mr. and Mrs.
32. See, e.g., Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, NAT. HIsT., July
1984, at 14.
33. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics,
76 B.U. L. REv. 421 (1996); see also Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the
Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 8-9 (1996) [hereinafter Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and
the Supreme Court].
34. See, e.g., DANIELJ. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 300-01 (1985); see
also Diane B. Paul, Eugenic Anxieties, Social Realities, and Political Choices, 59 Soc.
REs. 663 (1992).
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Dobbs. While living with the Dobbses, she attended school, pro-
gressing normally and receiving recommendations for promo-
tion every year. In 1918, the Dobbses withdrew Carrie from
school and kept her at home to help Mrs. Dobbs with
housework.35
In 1920, Mr. Dobbs, a town peace officer, successfully peti-
tioned to commit Carrie's mother to the Virginia Colony for the
Epileptic and the Feebleminded ("Virginia Colony"). Mrs.
Emma Buck was committed upon a finding that she was "feeble-
minded," and she was kept at the Virginia Colony until her death
twenty-four years later.3 6
Three years after her mother's commitment, Carrie Buck,
now seventeen years of age, became pregnant. She claimed that
she had been raped by the Dobbses' nephew, a claim the
Dobbses denied. Shortly thereafter, the Dobbses petitioned for
Carrie Buck's commitment to the Virginia Colony, claiming that
she was epileptic, feebleminded, and morally delinquent. The
Dobbses' family doctor and a second local physician reached the
medical judgments necessary for commitment, and the judge
who had committed her mother a few years earlier now, in Janu-
ary of 1924, ordered Carrie Buck committed as well.37
Her commitment was delayed until after she had given birth
to her daughter, Vivian. The infant Vivian was taken from her
shortly after birth and placed in the custody of the Dobbses.
35. See SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 1-3; Paul A. Lombardo, Eugenic
Sterilization 178-79 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lombardo, Eugenic Sterilization].
36. See SMrrH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 7-16.
37. See id. at 5-6, 24, 40; Lombardo, Eugenic Sterilization, supra note 35,
at 177-79; see also PHILIP REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF
INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (1991).
38. The Dobbses agreed to take custody of the infant Vivian upon one
condition, as set forth in a letter from Carrie Buck's social worker to the
Superintendent of the Virginia Colony:
It has been very difficult for us to decide what disposition to make in
the case of Carrie Buck as we feel that a baby whose mother and
grandmother are both feeble-minded ought not be placed out in a
home for adoption. However, the people who have had Carrie in
their home . . . are willing to keep the baby with the understanding
that it will be committed later on if it is found to be feeble-minded
also.
SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 23 (quoting a letter from Caroline Wilhelm,
Carrie Buck's social worker, to Dr. Albert S. Priddy, Superintendent of the Vir-
ginia Colony).
The Superintendent, on behalf of the Virginia Colony, responded to the
social worker's letter as follows:
Replying to your letter . . . I cannot advise you what disposition to
make of the baby other than to place it in the City Almshouse. Of
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Then, in June of 1924, Carrie Buck was committed to the Vir-
ginia Colony and assigned to a dormitory with about 200 resi-
dents; she worked in the dormitory kitchen, cooking and
cleaning from early in the morning into the evening.
39
Dr. Albert S. Priddy was the Superintendent of the Virginia
Colony at the time Carrie Buck was committed. He had also
been the prime mover in the campaign to enact Virginia's invol-
untary sterilization statute, which took effect in March of 1924,
shortly before Carrie Buck entered the Virginia Colony.4" In the
campaign for enactment of the statute, Priddy had worked
closely with a number of prominent Virginians whose personal
and professional lives were closely intertwined and who shared
his commitment to the program of eugenics, and, in many cases,
his commitment to containing social and sexual deviancy as
well.4 1 Among them was Mr. Aubrey Strode-an attorney and
course, should this child be ascertained to be feeble-minded we will
receive it here. However, the law puts a limit of 8 years in feeble-
minded cases and we could not take it until it is eight years of age.
Id. at 24 (quoting a letter from Dr. Albert S. Priddy, Superintendent of the
Virginia Colony, to Caroline Wilhelm, Carrie Buck's social worker).
39. See id. at 40, 44.
40. The statute was signed into law by the Governor of Virginia on March
20, 1924. See REILLY, supra note 37, at 86.
41. See Lombardo, Eugenic Sterilization, supra note 35, at 180-81. Paul
Lombardo provides a detailed history of the motivations and goals of those who
worked to establish the Virginia Colony and to enact the sterilization statute.
See id. at 67-176; see also Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New
Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 30 (1985) [hereinafter Lombardo,
New Light].
Lombardo argues that "popular acceptance of eugenical theory was not the
primary reason for passage of the Virginia sterilization act of 1924, nor for the
litigation that tested the act." Id. at 59. He argues that:
These relationships between the prime movers in Buck and prominent
members of the eugenical movement support the view that Buck v. Bell
is best understood not by focusing on the eugenical movement itself-
the common explanation of the case's outcome-but rather by
examining closely the web of personalities and events that were
essential to both the genesis and outcome of the case.
Id. at 59-60.
Lombardo continues:
Doctor Priddy's motives in proposing a sterilization program had less
to do with thinning the ranks of the mentally and physically bereft
than they had to do with satisfying his own strong and unique sense of
morality. Priddy was obsessed with placing checks on sexuality and
propagation. This obsession focused on eradication of the "moral
delinquents" whose unlicensed pregnancies he identified as the cause
of poverty, crime, disease, and the myriad afflictions of society. With
the passage of the Virginia sterilization law, he succeeded in winning
legal protection for his private surgical hobby.
Id. at 62.
THE UNSETTLED LEGACY OF BUCK v. BELL
former Virginia state senator-who drafted the legislative lan-
guage that eventually was enacted into law.42 Strode also served
as attorney for the Board of the Virginia Colony.
41
Priddy was motivated in this campaign by additional profes-
sional and personal concerns. Prior to enactment of the statute,
Priddy had taken it upon himself to pursue his eugenic and
moral commitments by forcibly sterilizing a number of individu-
als who found themselves within the confines of the Virginia Col-
ony. On one such occasion, he was sued afterwards and narrowly
escaped legal liability as well as professional disgrace. In the
course of the proceedings, the presiding judge warned Priddy
Nonetheless, Lombardo does not deny that eugenic thinking was an impor-
tant factor in passage of the act and in the subsequent decision in Buck v. Beli
noting that "[w] hile the case did represent the peak of public acceptance of
eugenical theory, characterizing Buck v. Bell merely as the result of 1920's pseu-
doscientific thought ignores the unique confluence of events and interplay of
personalities without which the case never would have occurred." Id. at 32.
Stephen Jay Gould concludes that, however the issues in the case might
have been framed, the case really was about "sexual morality and social devi-
ance." He writes:
... We know little of Emma Buck and her life, but we have no more
reason to suspect her than her daughter Carrie of true mental defi-
ciency. Their deviance was social and sexual; the charge of imbecility
was a cover-up, Mr. Justice Holmes notwithstanding.
Gould, supra note 32, at 16.
42. Strode initially was reluctant to undertake the effort because similar
proposals in other states generally had failed of enactment or, if enacted, were
struck down as unconstitutional. As Daniel Kevles writes of this period:
In many states, sterilization measures ran afoul of the courts, of
legislative opposition, of executive refusal to enforce, and of
gubernatorial vetoes.... Many of the laws were couched in punitive
rather than eugenic terms. Most did not provide elementary
procedural protection to those singled out for possible sterilization.
Most also confined eligibility for sterilization to people in state
institutions. Thus, the objections centered on violations of the
constitutional safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment, due
process of law, and equal protection of the laws.
KEVLES, supra note 34, at 109 (citation omitted); see also REILLY, supra note 37, at
50-55.
But Strode eventually changed his mind and drafted the bill that later was
enacted into law. He recounted the turning point in his decision to undertake
the effort-when the Governor of Virginia encouraged him to "'draft a
bill... curing such defects as I could in the form of the Acts declared invalid by
the courts, trusting that the growth of knowledge of the laws of heredity and
eugenics and changing public sentiment might bring a more favorable attitude
from the Legislature and the courts.'" SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 50; see
also Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court, supra note 33, at 8-9.
43. See SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 44; see also Lombardo, Eugenic
Sterilization, supra note 35, at 180-81.
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that henceforth he should not undertake involuntary steriliza-
tions without specific statutory authorization.44
With just such a statute now in force-granting authority to
sterilize those institutionalized individuals who were found to be
the probable potential parents of "socially inadequate" offspring,
for their own welfare and the welfare of society4 5-Priddy was in
a position to proceed. Shortly after Carrie Buck's commitment
to the Virginia Colony, Priddy selected her for sterilization pursu-
ant to the provisions of the statute and submitted a petition to
the Board of the Virginia Colony for this purpose.4 6 In support
of his petition, Priddy testified before the Board that Carrie Buck
was "feeble-minded of the lowest grade Moron class" with a
mental age of nine, as indicated by her performance on an intel-
ligence test.4 7 He testified further that three generations dis-
played "feeblemindedness"-Carrie Buck, her mother, and her
child-and that Carrie Buck and her descendants would bear
mentally handicapped children.48
Advising the Virginia Colony Board in its consideration of
Priddy's petition was the Board's attorney, and drafter of the stat-
44. Priddy sterilized a mother and her daughter following a police raid
for prostitution on their home that resulted in their temporary placement in
the Virginia Colony. This prompted a lawsuit by the family, and Priddy was
forced to defend his conduct on the basis of "therapeutic necessity." See
Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 37-45.
45. See id. at 48-49.
46. See id. at 43-48.
47. SMITH & NEILSON, supra note 31, at 44 (quoting from the testimony of
Dr. Priddy).
48. Priddy testified:
I have had Carrie Buck under observation and care since ... June 4,
1924, and from psychological examination and the Stanford revision
of the Binet-Simon mental test, I have ascertained that she is feeble-
minded of the lowest grade Moron class. Her mental age is nine
years .... [S]he is of unknown paternity, her mother ... is and has
been for several years a feeble-minded patient in the Colony of low
mental grade. According to the depositions Carrie has had one
illegitimate mentally defective child. She is a moral delinquent but
physically capable of earning her own living if protected against
childbearing by sterilization. Otherwise she would have to remain in
an institution for mentally [sic] defectives during the period of her
child-bearing potentiality covering thirty years. The history of all such
cases in which mental defectiveness, insanity and epilepsy develop in
three generations of feeble-minded persons is that the baneful effects
of heredity will be shown in descendents of all future generations.
Should she be corrected against child-bearing by the simple and
comparatively harmless operation of salpingectomy, she could leave
the institution, enjoy her liberty and life and become self-sustaining.
Id. (quoting from the testimony of Dr. Priddy); see also Lombardo, Eugenic Ster-
ilization, supra note 35, at 180-82.
THE UNSETTLED LEGACY OF BUCK v. BELL
ute, Strode.49 The Board approved the petition,50 and, upon the
urging of Priddy51 and Strode,52 decided to arrange for a consti-
tutional challenge to the Virginia statute as applied in her case, a
final step intended to assure Priddy and others who might
engage in eugenic sterilizations in Virginia that they could pro-
ceed without fear of legal liability. Mr. Irving P. Whitehead was
appointed to serve as Carrie Buck's attorney in the appeal of the
Board's order.53 Whitehead was a Democratic Party activist in
Virginia, a former Virginia Colony Board member who had par-
ticipated in the selection of Priddy as Superintendent, and a life-
long friend of Strode.5 4
Strode and Priddy then prepared their case for review by the
Virginia trial court.55 They enlisted the services of several of the
49. See SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 44; see also Lombardo, Eugenic
Sterilization, supra note 35, at 180-81.
50. The Board concluded that:
Carrie Buck is a feeble-minded inmate of this institution and by the
laws of heredity is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring likewise afflicted .... she may be sexually sterilized without
detriment to her general health, and... the welfare of the said Carrie
Buck and of society will be promoted by such sterilization.
SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 47-48 (quoting the Board's conclusion); see
also Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 48-50.
51. See Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 48. Priddy advised that "as
a matter of precautionary safety ... a test case of the constitutionality of the
Sterilization Law be made before any operation is performed." Id. (quoting
from the minutes of the Special Board of the Virginia Colony).
52. See id. at 48. Strode wrote to a friend, "I had to advise that the
Virginia Act had yet to stand the test of the Courts, whereupon I was instructed
to take to court a test case." SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 48. Strode
noted that other sterilization statutes had been declared unconstitutional on
due process grounds because of inadequate procedural safeguards. He advised
the Board that he had drafted the statute in a fashion he thought adequate to
repel any attack on due process grounds, but that the statute might be
vulnerable on equal protection grounds. The equal protection concern was
due to the statute's limited reach-it provided for the sterilization of
institutionalized feebleminded persons rather than all feebleminded persons.
See Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 48-49.
53. Lombardo concludes on the basis of his archival research that
Whitehead intentionally failed to provide appropriate legal representation for
Carrie Buck. Lombardo also documents Whitehead's longtime involvement in
promoting sterilization of those deemed "unfit." See Lombardo, New Light,
supra note 41, at 37-40.
54. Whitehead was appointed pursuant to the Board's direction to Carrie
Buck's guardian, Mr. Shelton, to hire "some competent lawyer" to represent
her in her appeal to the Virginia trial court. See Lombardo, New Light, supra
note 41, at 50.
55. Strode recounted:
I was instructed to take to court a test case. With the very active and
helpful cooperation of Doctors A. S. Priddy and J. S. Dejarnette this
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foremost eugenicists of the day to provide support for the two
claims central to their defense: that the eugenic theory underly-
ing the statute was sound, and that the statute's application to
Carrie Buck was appropriate.56 Both Priddy and another Vir-
ginia physician active in the eugenics movement, Dr. Joseph
Dejarnette, testified at trial.57 In addition, several witnesses testi-
fied to Carrie Buck's "social inadequacy" based upon their
acquaintance with her or with members of her family.58
The Virginia trial court approved the Board's sterilization
order, and the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the
order of the trial court.59 The case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, and Holmes authored the opinion of the
Court allowing the sterilization," over one dissent without opin-
was done, having as the subject of the litigation Carrie Buck, a typical
19-year-old, feeble-minded patient of the Colony having an illegitimate
infant already giving evidence of feeblemindedness, and Carrie's
mother also being a feeble-minded patient at the Colony.
SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 50-51 (quoting from the account of Strode).
56. See Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 53. A nationally prominent
eugenicist, Harry Laughlin, provided a deposition tying the evidence
concerning Carrie Buck to broader eugenic theory. See id. at 50 n.109 and
accompanying text. Based upon his review of the record, Laughlin opined that
Carrie Buck and her family, "'[belonged] to the shiftless, ignorant, and
worthless class of anti-social whites of the South.'" Id. at 51 (quoting the
deposition of Laughlin).
57. See id. at 50 n.111 and accompanying text; see also SMrrH & NELSON,
supra note 31, at 48.
58. See Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 50.
59. Priddy died in January of 1925, and Dr. Bell succeeded him as
superintendent of the Virginia Colony, hence the change in the title of the case
to Buck v. Bell. See Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 55 n.152 and
accompanying text.
Lombardo discovered minutes of the Board meeting that followed close on
the heels of the decision by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The
minutes stated:
Colonel Aubrey E. Strode and Mr. I.P. Whitehead appeared before the
Board and outlined the present status of the sterilization test case and
presented conclusive argument for its prosecution through the
Supreme Court of the United States, their advice being that this
particular case was in admirable shape to go to the court of last resort,
and that we could not hope to have a more favorable situation than
this one.
Id. at 56 (quoting from the minutes of the Board) (emphasis added). This is
one of the pieces of evidence cited by Lombardo in support of his thesis that
Whitehead intentionally failed to represent Carrie Buck adequately. See also
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60. Justice Holmes found that the statute provided adequate procedural
protections and that these protections had been observed. See Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 206-07 (1927). He dispensed with the equal protection argument
(the statute provided for the involuntary sterilization only of institutionalized
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ion.61 A motion for reconsideration was denied,62 and on Octo-
ber 19, 1927, Carrie Buck was sterilized by tubal ligation at the
Virginia Colony.6"
Shordy thereafter, Carrie Buck was paroled from the Vir-
ginia Colony and placed in households to work as a domestic
servant-under threat of recommitment to the Virginia Colony if
her conduct was unsatisfactory. She left her last placement to
marry her first husband in 1932.64 She was later widowed and
then remarried. When interviewed late in life, she reported
regret at not being able to have children during her married life;
she did not understand at the time the sterilization was per-
formed that this would be its consequence. Those who knew her
reported that she was a devoted wife and very close to her sister
and brother. She was a lively conversationalist, a fan of drama
and music, and an avid reader of newspapers, although not a
sophisticated person or a person possessed of social graces. Car-
rie Buck died in 1983.65
Although little is known about Carrie Buck's mother,66 it
seems quite clear that neither Carrie Buck nor her child was
mentally handicapped. 67 The assertions made in the case regard-
feebleminded persons rather than all feebleminded persons), by declaring that
"so far as the operations [of the statute] enable those who otherwise must be
kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the asylum to others,
the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached." Id. at 208.
61. Justice Pierce Butler dissented without opinion. See id. at 208. His
dissent is commonly assumed to be connected to his Catholicism. See
Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 57 n.162. Martin Pernick, drawing upon
an admittedly limited sample of public statements by persons of various
political and religious affiliations in the early twentieth century regarding
eugenic decisions not to treat handicapped infants, writes that "[p]ublic
statements on saving impaired newborns portray the Democrats as sharply split
along religious lines. Four-fifths of Catholic Democrats quoted demanded
treatment for all babies. Just over one-quarter of the non-Catholic Democrats
who spoke out favored that position." MARTIN S. PERNICK, THE BLACK STORK:
EUGENICS AND THE DEATH OF "DEFECTIVE" BABIES IN AMERICAN MEDICINE AND
MOTION PICTURES SINCE 1915, at 34 (1996).
62. See Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 57-58.
63. See id. at 58; see also SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at xviii.
64. See SMITH & NELSON, supra note 31, at 185-212.
65. See id. at 213-22.
66. Lombardo writes, "[o]f the three generations, the least is known
about Emma Buck. She died at the Colony, leaving few records of her life. She
was, at worst, the 'moron' that Priddy claimed; no one but Homes charged her
with imbecility." Lombardo, New Light, supra note 41, at 61 (citation omitted).
67. The only evidence presented at trial to support the contention that
Carrie Buck's daughter suffered a mental handicap was the testimony of Carrie
Buck's social worker, Miss Wilhelm, who observed the child at seven months of
age and compared her to the grandchild of the Dobbses of about the same age:
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ing the heritability of mental handicap are now known to have
been mistaken.68
Carrie Buck's only child, her daughter Vivian, continued to
live with the Dobbses. She progressed normally in school, and
was named to the school's honor roll on one occasion. Vivian
died from an infectious disease in 1932, when she was eight years
old.69
Later examination of the records of the Virginia Colony
revealed that over 4,000 sterilizations were performed there,
including the covert sterilization of Carrie Buck's sister, Miss
Doris Buck.7 ° In the wake of Buck v. Bell, a number of state legis-
latures enacted involuntary sterilization statutes, now assured of
their insulation from constitutional attack.71 Tens of thousands
of Americans were involuntarily sterilized pursuant to these stat-
utes over the next few decades.72 Other nations also enacted and
applied involuntary sterilization statutes during the early twenti-
eth century; hundreds of thousands of individuals around the
world were sterilized pursuant to statutes of this sort.73 Nazi offi-
It is difficult to judge probabilities of a child as young as that, but it
seems to me not quite a normal baby. In its appearance-I should say
that perhaps my knowledge of the mother may prejudice me in that
regard, but I saw the child at the same time as Mrs. Dobbs' daughter's
baby, which is only three days older than this one, and there is a very
decided difference in the development of the babies. That was about
two weeks ago. There is a look about it that is not quite normal, but
just what it is, I can't tell.
Gould, supra note 32, at 16 (quoting from the trial testimony of Wilhelm).
68. As Gould writes, "[s]ome forms of mental deficiency are passed by
inheritance in family lines, but most are not." Id. at 15.
69. See Gould, supra note 32, at 18.
70. Doris Buck was told that her operation was an appendectomy. She
didn't learn until late in life why it was that she had never been able to conceive
a child. See id. at 15.
71. A number of states had already enacted sterilization statutes. Indiana
was the first to do so, in 1907. See id. at 14. By the 1930s, over thirty states had
enacted such measures. See id.
72. For accounts of this, see ELLEN BRANTLINGER, STERILIZATION OF
PEOPLE wrrH DISAiBILIEs: ISSUES, PERSPECrIvS, AND CASES 22 (1995); MARK H.
HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDirrARAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 139
(1963); Lombardo, Eugenic Sterilization, supra note 35, at 252-53; KENNETH M.
LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETr: A HISTORICAL APPROACH 95
(1972); PERNICK, supra note 61, at 150; DONALD K. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE
PROGRESSIVES 91 (1968); REILLY, supra note 37, at 141; SMITH & NELSON, supra
note 31, at 2.
73. The Nazi Eugenic Sterilization Law was promulgated in 1933. The
statute applied to persons whether institutionalized or not who suffered
purported hereditary disabilities including "feeblemindedness, schizophrenia,
epilepsy, blindness, severe drug or alcohol addiction, and physical deformities
that seriously interfered with locomotion or were grossly offensive." KEvLEs,
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cials in the pre-war era were particularly eager to give credit to
their American eugenicist counterparts for their pioneer work in
crafting eugenic sterilization statutes and for their scientific work
in support of the eugenic cause.74
supra note 34, at 116-17. As Kevles reports, "[w]ithin three years, German
authorities had sterilized some two hundred and twenty-five thousand
people .... About half were reported to be feebleminded." Id.
For a study of eugenics in Nazi Germany, see ROBERT PROCTOR, RACIAL
HYGIENE: MEDICINE UNDER THE NAZIS (1988). For a recent study bringing to
light eugenic practices in Scandinavia, see EUGENICS AND THE WELFAE STATE:
STERILIZATION PoIicv IN DENMARK, SWEDEN, NORWAY, AND FINLAND (Gunnar
Broberg & Nils Roll-Hansen eds., 1996).
74. See KEvLEs, supra note 34, at 118. Harry Laughlin, a prominent
eugenicist who provided a deposition in Carrie Buck's trial, drafted a model bill
in 1922 that aimed to "'prevent the procreation of persons socially inadequate
from defective inheritance, by authorizing and providing for eugenical
sterilization of certain potential parents carrying degenerate hereditary
qualities.'" Gould, supra note 32, at 14 (quoting Laughlin's model bill). The
categories of persons covered by Laughlin's model bill included the "'blind,
including those with seriously impaired vision; deaf, including those with
seriously impaired hearing; and dependent, including orphans, ne'er-do-wells,
the homeless, tramps, and paupers.'" Id (quoting Laughlin's model bill).
Laughlin's model bill served as the basis for the Nazi Sterilization Law. See id.;
see also EUGENICS AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 73, at 170; PROCTOR, supra
note 73, at 108-09.
The German admiration for American eugenic sterilization efforts was
reciprocated by many Americans. Paul Popenoe of the Human Betterment
Foundation in Pasadena, California, wrote in the Journal of Heredity in 1933:
Germany's eugenic sterilization law.., is no hasty improvisation of the
Nazi regime. It has been taking shape gradually during many years, in
the discussions of eugenicists....
But Hitler himself-though a bachelor-has long been a convinced
advocate of race betterment through eugenic measures .... In his
book, Mein Kampf ... he bases his hopes of national regeneration
solidly on the application of biological principles to human society....
• . . While the German law is well drawn and, in form, may be
considered better than the sterilization laws of most American states,
the success of any such measure naturally depends on conservative,
sympathetic, and intelligent administration. Apparently the Nazis are
doing their best to prevent criticism on this score, no doubt with the
realization that their actions are regarded with suspicion in many
quarters.
Newspaper accounts have generally said that 400,000 people are to be
sterilized under the law. The statement appears to be unfounded.
What German authorities have said is that about 400,000 people would
be examined, to determine whether they should be sterilized. This
number of course includes the inmates of all hospitals for the mentally
diseased, institutions for the mentally deficient, homes and asylums
for the blind, deaf, and other defectives, and the inmates of all
prisons. Naturally, not all of these will be sterilized, though all will be
examined with that in view. ...
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III. CONSTRUCTING THE LEGACY OF BuCK v. Bv-L
Contemplating decisions like Dred Scott, Korematsu and Buck
v. Bell is not pleasant; the wrongs done never can be undone.
Yet, there is room for good to follow in the wake of disaster. The
legacies of these decisions continue to change the world for the
better in ways that the authors of these decisions could not have
imagined and would never abide.
Much hard work has been done in constructing the legacy of
Buck v. Bell. I now turn to an assessment of this work, examining
the wrongs identified-reliance upon unsound science, intru-
sion upon reproductive liberty, and endorsement of a coercive,
governmentally sanctioned program of eugenics-and the reme-
dies proposed to guard against recurrence of these wrongs.
With respect to the first source of wrongdoing-reliance
upon unsound science-commentators have noted that the theo-
ries of mental handicap and of the heritability of mental handi-
cap that were incorporated into the Virginia statute and applied
in the case were mistaken and that the intelligence tests and
other observational methods used to diagnose mental handicap
in Carrie Buck and her daughter were unreliable.7 5 The steriliza-
tion of Carrie Buck could not have achieved its purported pur-
pose because Carrie Buck was not mentally handicapped and,
even if she had been, she was not likely to have children who
were.
In Dred Scott, there was no concern shown for the scientific
truth of the matter; on Taney's jurisprudential take, the truth was
not relevant to a just result. In Buck v. Bell, on the other hand,
the scientific claims were treated as crucially relevant. Yet, from
the inception of the process that culminated in Carrie Buck's
[.. T]he Nazis seem, as this scientific [eugenic] leadership becomes
more and more prominent in their councils, to be avoiding the
misplaced emphasis of their earlier pronouncements on questions of
race, and to be proceeding toward a policy that will accord with the
best thought of eugenicists in all civilized countries.
Paul Popenoe, The German Sterilization Law, 24 J. HEREDITY 257, 257, 259-60
(1933).
For a recent study exploring the connection between Nazi and American
eugenics, see STEFAN KUHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN
RACISM, AND GERMAN NATIONAL SoCIALISM (1994).
75. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 32, at 14; see alsoJohn M. Conley, "The First
Principle of Real Reform": The Role of Science in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 65 N.C.
L. REv. 935 (1987) (providing a summary of the scientific evidence relied upon
in the case and examining the difficulties inherent in the employment of
science in legal fora); Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional
Law, 76 OR. L. REv. 111 (1997) (arguing that references to science in the case
were rhetorical).
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sterilization, none of those responsible for deciding her fate
exerted any effort to investigate the soundness of the eugenic
science that purportedly justified it.
Thus, Buck v. Bell instructs us in the awful consequences that
may follow when those invested with the power of the state imple-
ment decisions with serious implications for the lives of others on
the faith of unscrutinized and unsound scientific claims. In this
case, as in Dred Scott, we can see that these "scientific claims" may
constitute part of the respectable cover for social and political
agendas that, when revealed to plain view, present a far less
appealing appearance. So we surely should understand Buck v.
Bell as, in part, about wrongful reliance on unsound science and
we surely should pursue remedies that require careful and dis-
passionate scrutiny of scientific claims, especially 'those wielded
by parties bearing weighty agendas.
While this unsound science critique is powerful and an
important part of the legacy of Buck v. Bell, it also is in need of
refinement and qualification in light of the nature of scientific
practice. Scientific practice is, on the view of most, progressive,
in the sense that today's science is constantly being refined,
extended, revised and supplanted by tomorrow's. Scientific prac-
tice also is unruly, in the sense that it is difficult to devise and
enforce norms to reduce the likelihood of abuse.
Governmental decision-makers who rely upon scientific
claims run the risk of those who build on shifting sands. Science
progresses relentlessly, showing no respect for reliance placed on
claims that win no place in revised theory. Yet, when issues
before our legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts turn
upon the scientific truth of the matter, we surely do not want our
decision-makers to abjure the scientific for fear of this risk.
Instead, our hope is that they will base their decisions upon the
best science of the day. We must accept, with regret, that even
though they do, the progress of science may one day transform
their decisions from sound to unsound.
But even after we settle upon the best that we might hope
for, there remains the problem of implementation, of devising
and enforcing norms that will help us achieve this modest goal.
It is not always easy to determine the best science of the day or to
ensure that decision-makers will choose to rely upon it.
At the time Buck v. Bell was decided, there were eugenic
scientists as well as scientists working in related fields who had
good reason to doubt some of the claims of eugenic science.76
76. See, e.g., MARK HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN A-rITUDES IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 130-31 (1963) (describing the knowledge of Harry
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But many of the early-twentieth-century eugenicists in America
and abroad were accomplished and respected scientists.77 Some
of them, indeed, came to realize and to acknowledge, in the way
of truth-seekers, that their earlier claims had been mistaken.78 In
any event, at the time Buck v. Bell was decided, eugenic science
was a respectable enterprise, not an obvious exercise in pseudo-
science by disreputable individuals. So we might fairly ask
whether the case of Buck v. Bell was an instance of regrettable
reliance on scientific claims that simply turned out to have been
mistaken.
But perhaps we can do a better job of identifying the best
science of the day. At any given time, there will be wide and
deep consensus as to the soundness of some scientific claims, and
there will be something well short of this with respect to many
other claims. A wide and deep consensus is no guarantee of cor-
rectness, just as scientific change is no guarantee of progress
toward the truth of the matter. But when governmental decision-
makers rely upon scientific claims, surely they ought to take cog-
nizance of the status of these claims within the scientific commu-
nity. For it is from this community that judgments of truth and
falsity emerge.
Had those involved in Buck v. Bell chosen to conduct a care-
ful and dispassionate inquiry into the status of the eugenic claims
in the case, they would have discovered doubts and divisions
within the eugenic and wider scientific communities.79 It surely
would have been more difficult, under these circumstances-
with full awareness that these eugenic claims might well be
false-to authorize an intrusion of such magnitude and
consequence.
But there also was a wide and deep consensus in the political
community about the urgency of the social problem of the prop-
agation of the "unfit."8" This consensus might well have made
failure to authorize a remedy appear imprudent. And govern-
mental decision-makers, after all, are held accountable in the
domain of public policy, not science.
Laughlin and other promoters of the eugenics movement that some of the
scientific claims of the movement were not justified); see also KEvLEs, supra note
34, at 48-49.
77. See KEVLES, supra note 34, at 3-56 (describing the contributions as well
as shortcomings of eugenicists Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, Charles
Davenport, Harry Laughlin and numerous others, and providing an assessment
of their work with respect to the hereditary character of diseases).
78. See id. at 134.
79. See id. at 48-49; HALLER, supra note 72, at 130-31.
80. See KEvt.Es, supra note 34, at 96-118.
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Perhaps, then, it is practitioners of science who should be
called upon to exercise a more political role, challenging scien-
tific claims they believe to be inadequately supported or fraudu-
lent, and making these challenges and their resolutions a matter
of public record. In this way, scientists might ensure that the sci-
entific truth of the matter is among those considerations that
count in the domain of public policy.
Thus, perhaps we should refine our understanding of the
wrong done in Buck v. Bell, focusing more of our attention upon
the failure of practitioners of science to live up to their profes-
sional and public obligations. Had they discharged these obliga-
tions, perhaps eugenic science would not have remained
respectable for long and, consequently, governmental decision-
makers would not have felt justified in relying upon its claims.
So we might encourage proper discharge of these obliga-
tions by requiring systematic peer review81 and, by supporting
and protecting, as a last resort, whistleblowing on fraudulent sci-
entific activities.82 Peer review and whistleblowing are always ten-
uous enterprises, however.8 3 These activities bring little promise
of personal or professional reward and invite charges-some-
times warranted-of competitive or other improper motivation.
So, in addition, we might seek to establish and enforce stan-
dards for the use of scientific claims in governmental fora, stan-
dards that focus upon the methods and judgments of the
scientific community. 4 But, as the controversy surrounding cur-
81. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289a (1994) (establishing peer review
requirements for applications for biomedical and behavioral research grants
and contracts from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and periodic peer
review requirements for research at the NIH).
82. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289b (1994) (establishing the Office of Research
Integrity within the Department of Health and Human Services, requiring
applicants for funding for biomedical or behavioral research to provide
assurances that they have research misconduct procedures in place and will
report any instances of such misconduct, and providing protection for
whistleblowers against retaliation).
83. For a recent study of a wrenching case involving whistleblowing, see
DANIEL J. KEVLES, THE BALTIMORE CASE: A TRIAL OF POLITICS, SCIENCE, AND
CHARACTER (1998).
84. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
(requiring trial judges to assess proffered expert scientific testimony-applying
standards that may include the testability of a scientific theory, whether there
has been peer review and publication of the theory, the error rate and
standards controlling its operation, and whether it is widely accepted in the
scientific community). The Daubert standard replaced the Frye test, see Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which held scientific evidence
inadmissible unless generally accepted in the scientific community. For
discussions of practical issues in connection with the Daubert standard, see Bert
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rent judicial standards for scientific evidence reveals,"5 it is not
easy for anyone, scientist, legislator, or jurist, to arrive at such
standards. While the filter of history works exceedingly well in
separating the sound from the unsound, implementation of con-
Black, Post-Daubert and Joiner Caselaw: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, in
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 145 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Feb. 12, 1998); Lynn R.
Johnson et al., Expert Testimony in Federal Court: Frye, Daubert, and Joiner, in
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra, at 177. For the perspective of an expert witness on
the use of scientific evidence in the courtroom, see ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS &
KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY- FALSE MEMORIES AND
ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (1996) (regarding claims of repressed memories
of sexual abuse); ELIZABETH F. LorTus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE
DEFENSE: THE ACCUSED, THE EyEwIrNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON
TRIAL (1991) (regarding the fallibility of memory).
85. The Daubert standard has attracted considerable commentary, much
of it critical. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good
Philosophy of Science would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L.
REv. 803; Adina Schwartz, A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye
v. United States, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
For critical perspectives from the bar and bench, see Michael H.
Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?, 40
ARIz. L. REv. 753 (1998) (the attorney who argued the Daubert and Joiner cases
for the plaintiffs at the Supreme Court argues for judicial standards that take
cognizance of the public good and congressional intent); Alex Kozinski, Brave
New World, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 997 (1997) (Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Kozinski describes the Ninth Circuit decisions in Daubert and assesses the
merits of the Daubert standard); Ronald W. Tochterman, A (California) Trial
Judge Dissents, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1013 (1997) (arguing for the merits of the
earlier Frye test).
Some commentary addresses other public policy issues connected to the
use of scientific evidence. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants
Revisited: Beyond Science on Tria4 1997 WIs. L. REv. 705 (arguing that plaintiffs'
claims in the breast implant litigation lacked scientific merit, but that the
litigation was the consequence of failures by physicians, manufacturers, and the
Food and Drug Administration to ensure that well-designed studies of breast
implants were conducted early on); Lars Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review:
Publication as a Proxy for Regulatory Decisionmaking, 59 U. PIr. L. REv. 677 (1998)
(assessing the reliance of governmental agencies upon scientific claims that
receive the sanction of peer reviewers); Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science-The
Lawyer's Ethical Responsibilities, 25 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 449 (1998) (former U.S.
Attorney General Thornburgh argues that the Daubert standard will not resolve
the problem of "junk science" in the courtroom-the problem requires lawyers
to exercise their ethical responsibilities).
Some commentary suggests practical measures for implementing the
Daubert standard. See, e.g., Laura S. Pinsky, Comment, The Use of Scientic Peer
Review and Colloquia to Assist Judges in the Admissibility Gatekeeping Mandated by
Daubert, 34 Hous. L. REv. 527 (1997); Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping:
Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 HARv. L. REv. 941 (1997).
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temporaneous filters of human devising will always be
imperfect.
8 6
So, although we might properly understand Buck v. Bell as an
example of the harms that flow from reliance upon unsound sci-
ence, we also must recognize the complexity of the relationship
between science and governmental decision-making and the
inevitability of certain sorts of errors. With awareness of these
limits to any safeguards we might devise against reliance upon
unsound science, we might now return to test our public under-
standing of the nature of the wrongdoing in Buck v. Bell.
Assume that, at the time of Buck v. Bell, these safeguards
were in place-and worked. Assume that the science relied upon
in Buck v. Bell was right-that is, assume that Carrie Buck was
mentally handicapped due to a genetic condition and that her
condition was heritable. Would Buck v. Bell, under these circum-
stances, have been rightly decided?
This is not an idle question. Genetic science of the twenty-
first century likely will enable us to identify genes that influence,
even if they do not determine, our physical and mental capabili-
ties and, perhaps, our behaviors as well. The unsound science
critique, in and of itself, tells us nothing about whether it would
be wrong to undertake a governmental program of forced sterili-
zation of those determined to be "carriers" of "defective" genes,
however these might be defined.
To help us address this question, we should consider two
additional critiques of Buck v. Bell. First, we will consider the cri-
tique of the intrusion upon Carrie Buck's reproductive liberty,
then the critique of the endorsement of a coercive, governmen-
tally sanctioned program of eugenics.
We surely should understand the case as an instance of
wrongful intrusion upon reproductive liberty. Indeed, subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions have recognized a fundamental
right to procreation, as well as a right of privacy that includes
86. As John M. Conley writes about statistical evidence used in civil rights
and employment discrimination cases:
The courts have developed reasonable facility in qualifying statistical
experts, in determining that particular methods are widely used, and
in ensuring that analyses are carefully performed. Yet beneath the
growing consensus on the use of some methods is an often obscure
debate among statisticians about the theoretical justifications for
particular methods and the propriety of transferring them from one
context to another. The outcome of these debates could cause today's
scientific "fact" to become tomorrow's heresy, and today's enlightened
legal decision to become a latter day Buck v. Bell.
Conley, supra note 75, at 942 (citations omitted).
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both rights of procreation and of abortion. And commentators
commonly cite these decisions as part of the legacy of Buck v.
BelL8
7
These decisions have not, however, overruled Buck v. Bell"
In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,s° the United States
Supreme Court struck down as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause an Oklahoma statute that provided for involuntary sterili-
zation of three-time felons, but that exempted from its reach
three-time embezzlers and other white-collar felons. The Skinner
Court recognized a fundamental right of procreation, but none-
theless expressly endorsed the holding and reasoning of Buck v.
Bell.9" Likewise, in Roe v. Wade,9 1 in recognizing a privacy right
87. See generally sources cited supra note 33.
88. See Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court, supra note 33
(discussing the relationship among Buck v. Bell and subsequent reproductive
rights cases).
89. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
90. The opinion for the Court stated:
But the instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection clause
.... We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race. . . . There is no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment
which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever
deprived of a basic liberty. We mention these matters not to
reexamine the scope of the police power of the States. We advert to
them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the
classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against
groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional
guaranty of just and equal laws.... Sterilization of those who have
thrice committed grand larceny, with immunity for those who are
embezzlers, is a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination.
Oklahoma makes no attempt to say that he who commits larceny by
trespass or trick or fraud has biologically inheritable traits which he
who commits embezzlement lacks....
The equal protection clause would indeed be a formula of empty
words if such conspicuously artificial lines [as those between larceny
by fraud and embezzlement] could be drawn.... In Buck v. Bell... the
Virginia statute was upheld though it applied only to feeble-minded
persons in institutions of the State. But it was pointed out that 'so far
as the operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined
to be returned to the world, and thus open the asylum to others, the
equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.'
Id. at 542 (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (citations omitted)).
The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Stone stated:
Undoubtedly a state may, after appropriate inquiry, constitutionally
interfere with the personal liberty of the individual to prevent the
transmission by inheritance of his socially injurious tendencies.
Id. at 545 (1942) (citing Buck).
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that included both rights of procreation and of abortion, the
Court cited Buck v. Bell as an example of a legitimate restriction
on the right of procreation. 2
But post-Roe v. Wade United States Supreme Court decisions
concerning reproductive liberty do not refer to Buck v. Bell. And
on the rare occasions since the 1960s that courts have approved
the involuntary sterilization of mentally handicapped individuals,
they have not appealed to eugenic goals. Rather, they have justi-
fied their decisions by reference to the interests of the individu-
als concerned.93
The absence of cites to Buck v. Bell in the post-Roe reproduc-
tive rights decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court may reflect some
embarrassment about the case in the light of facts about it that
have been unearthed in recent years, or in light of the sensibili-
ties about mental handicap that have evolved since the 197 0s. Or
perhaps the questions that Buck v. Bell poses so starkly about the
nature of our community interest in the reproductive conduct of
others are considered moot, both as a practical and a theoretical
matter. In the post-Roe era, reproductive choice are widely con-
sidered to be fundamentally private choices.
As a matter of fact, however, we never have enjoyed, and
never could enjoy, reproductive privacy or liberty in a very broad
or deep sense. This is not because our reproductive choices and
liberties are unimportant-just the opposite. Because reproduc-
tion is so very important, it never can be free of a dense web of
biological, social, ethical, religious, and legal conditions and con-
straints. While much of our legal and public policy discourse is
91. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. The Court noted that the privacy right is not absolute; there is not "an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases." Id. at 154. The Court
continued: "The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind
in the past." Id. (citing Buck).
93. See, e.g., In re Wirsing, 573 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 1998) (authorizing
sterilization of a profoundly mentally handicapped woman on the basis that it
would be in her best interests). For an introduction to the critical debate
regarding sterilization of the mentally handicapped, and parenting by the
mentally handicapped, see ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN
BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING 54-60 (1996); Norman C. Fost, Ethical Issues in the
Care of Handicapped, Chronically 114 and Dying Children, PEDIATRiCS REv., Apr.
1985, at 291; Robert L. Hayman, Jr. , Presumptions ofJustice: Law, Politics, and the
Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 -LRv. L. REv. 1201 (1990); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy,
1986 DuKE L.J. 806; S. Sheth & A. Malpani, Vaginal Hysterectomy for the
Management of Menstruation in Mentally Retarded Women, 35 INT'LJ. GYNECOLOGY
OBsTETRTucs 319 (1991); Joe Zumpano-Canto, Nonconsensual Sterilization of the
Mentally Disabled in North Carolina: An Ethics Critique of the Statutory Standard and
its Judicial Interpretation, 13J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 79 (1996).
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conducted in the one-dimensional language of rights and inter-
ests, we surely do not conduct our reproductive lives in a compa-
rably one-dimensional world.
.The decision in Buck v. Bell derives part of its rhetorical
power from Holmes's use of a richer language than that of rights
and interests. With bold strokes, Holmes sketches his conception
of the meaning of our reproductive lives. If we are to arrive at a
clear and comprehensive public understanding of the legacy of
Buck v. Bell, an understanding that incorporates an adequate
alternative conception, we will need to employ a richer language
as well. It will not suffice to say that the wrong done to Carrie
Buck consisted of an intrusion upon her liberty and the remedy
consists in the establishment of a regime of reproductive rights,
just as it will not suffice to say that the wrong done in Korematsu
consisted of a deprivation of liberty and the remedy consists in
the establishment of a regime of civil rights. If we are to con-
struct the legacies of Buck v. Bell and of Korematsu so that they will
be secure against the pressures of exigency, we must sink
stronger and deeper roots. Perhaps we can come closer to con-
structing such a legacy for Buck v. Bell if we consider the third
source of wrongdoing in the case.
Holmes's conception of our reproductive lives was closely
bound up with the goals of the eugenics movement. It would
appear that these goals have been thoroughly discredited. Legis-
latures no longer enact eugenic legislation, courts no longer
sanction eugenic goals, and genetic counselors agree that it is
illegitimate to promote eugenic goals in the course of genetic
counseling.94 If any part of the legacy of Buck v. Bell is secure, it
would appear to be our shared public understanding of the ille-
gitimacy of the project of eugenics. So we might conclude, in
answer to the question posed at the conclusion of our considera-
tion of the unsound science critique, that the legacy of Buck v.
Bell would preclude involuntary sterilization of a mentally handi-
capped person for eugenic purposes.
But we must consider the new possibilities that the new
genetic knowledge and technology of the twenty-first century will
introduce. Private individuals may well enjoy the power to
engage in voluntary genetic engineering of their children,
whether to relieve them of disease or disability or to "enhance"
their physical, mental, or behavioral features. Eugenicists of the
94. See generally Arthur L. Caplan, Neutrality is Not Morality: The Ethics of
Genetic Counseling in PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE: ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN
GENETIC COUNSELING 149 (Dianne M. Bartels et al. eds., 1993); see also Paul,
supra note 34.
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early-twentieth century saw sterilization, whether voluntary or
involuntary, as the best means to attain their eugenic goals; the
chief impediments to realization of these goals were the resist-
ance of those targeted for sterilization and the shortcomings of
eugenic science. But in a new era, neither impediment need
interfere with the realization of eugenic goals. The legacy of
Buck v. Bell, as we have constructed it to date, appears to offer us
no instruction regarding voluntary genetic engineering in this
new era. I propose, however, to extend our understanding of the
legacy of Buck v. Bell.
V. EXTENDING THE LEGACY OF BUCK V. BELL
To begin, we might note that Carrie Buck was used quite
callously by all concerned as an instrument to their various ends.
But instrumental use of others, of the innocuous as well as the
offensive sort, is a commonplace in human affairs. What is dis-
tinctive about the abuse of Carrie Buck is that it consisted in
targeting her as one might target livestock in a scientific breed-
ing program; in her case, she was targeted for elimination from
the breeding stock.
I suggest that this treatment of Carrie Buck was the product
of a particular project pursued by those who held a particular
sort of scientific worldview. From the perspective of this
worldview, human beings appear as appropriate subjects for the
assertion of scientific and technological mastery. This assertion
of mastery is justified by the claimed improvement it brings in
human welfare.
We might refer to this particular project as the project of
"Baconian reflexivity." The larger project of Francis Bacon and
his heirs-some might say, the chief project of modernity-was
to develop and apply scientific and technological mastery of the
natural world to advance human welfare.95 In the reflexive turn
95. Cameron Wybrow summarizes the historical roots of the Baconian
project:
In the spirit of the Renaissance, Baconianism emphasized the high
rational and creative potential of man, but in addition, it fostered a
new, more aggressive attitude toward nature, an attitude which can be
identified as the dominant modern one .... The Baconians pointed
to the Bible, especially the Old Testament, as their inspiration for the
idea of a virtually unlimited human dominion over nature, a
dominion to be sustained by a penetrating inquiry into nature and an
intensive manipulation of nature through human art.
CAMERON WYBROW, THE BIBLE, BACONIANISM, AND MASTERY OVER NATURE: THE
OLD TESTAMENT AND ITS MODERN MISREADING 173 (1991).
Assessments of the feasibility and worth of this larger Baconian project
surely differ, but these assessments are not the concern of this Article.
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in this project, the Baconian sights are trained upon human
beings, conceived now as constituents of the natural world. It is
this exercise in Baconian reflexivity-in this case, the assertion of
control over what kinds of people there should be-that is the
fourth source of wrongdoing in Buck v. Bell.
The scientific worldview that supports this particular project
is exemplified by the jurisprudence of Holmes. Holmes has been
variously characterized as progressive and conservative;96 utilita-
rian and poet;97 a bulwark against those who would infringe
96. See the discussion of Holmes as dubious progressive in G. EDWARD
WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 378-411
(1993). As G. Edward White notes, Holmes's reputation as a progressive was
primarily owing to his judicial deference to legislative reform measures, most of
which he did not agree with. See id. at 390-91. As White writes:
[Holmes believed] that majoritarian power and force were the
principal determinants of social policy, that such power and force
were only temporarily held, and therefore that the "progression" of
various policies in the history of a nation was simply one majority
temporarily shifting its burdens to its neighbors. Such views were
hardly consistent with enthusiasm for legislative policies in themselves,
or even with enthusiasm for legislative "solutions" to perceived social
problems, except as contrasted with the outright killing of the enemies
of the majority.
Id. at 391.
Evidence of Holmes's underlying conservatism appears in his
correspondence:
I think the robbery of labor by capital is a humbug. The real competi-
tors are different kinds of labor. The capitalist by his power may turn
a part into directions that you deem undesirable-but if he does he
does it because he thinks a body of consumers will want the product
and he is the best prophet we can get. Some kind of despotism is at
the bottom of the seeking for change. I don't care to boss my neigh-
bors and to require them to want something different from what they
do-even when, as frequently, I think their wishes more or less sui-
cidal. It is not really theory but a prophecy that the crowd having got
the power will use it to smash this or that that lays the foundation for
much of the fundamentally innovating talk.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 12, 1927), in 2
HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAR-
OLDJ. LASKI, 1916-1935, at 941-42 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
97. On Holmes as utilitarian, H. L. Pohlman writes, "[m]y thesis is that
the central core of Holmes's substantive jurisprudence and philosophical
methodology arose from the premises of utilitarian legal philosophy." H.L.
POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 4
(1984). Richard Posner, who also acknowledges a utilitarian character to
Holmes's jurisprudence, nonetheless locates the heart of his jurisprudence in
his rhetoric. He writes:
... Holmes's true greatness is not as a lawyer, judge, or legal theorist
in a narrowly professional sense of these words, but as a writer, and, in
a loose sense . . . as a philosopher-in fact as a "writer-philosopher";
and . . . his distinction as a lawyer, judge, and legal theorist lies
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upon the liberties of the people and an insensitive, detached,
and uncaring rubber stamp for abuse of the weak by the power-
ful;98 America's greatestjurist and America's greatest judicial fail-
ure.9 9 Perhaps the most helpful way to understand Holmes's
jurisprudence, at least for purposes of my argument here, is in
the way he chose to represent it-as an exemplification of law
conceived as science. 100
precisely in the infusion of literary skill and philosophical insight into
his legal work.
Richard A. Posner, Introduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE
LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WEN-
DELL HOLMES, JR. at xvi (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE ESSEN-
TIAL HOLMES].
98. White acknowledges a basis for Justice Holmes's reputation as a
protector of free speech, but notes an apparent inconsistency with other aspects
of his jurisprudence:
In speech cases Holmes came to develop a framework that viewed
legislative regulation of expression with suspicion and even hostility.
Among the rationales he formulated to justify protection of
.unpopular" speech was that of the "marketplace of ideas," in which
novel opinions were given an opportunity to secure popularity and
stature. The model of the "marketplace of ideas" has appeared
radically inconsistent with Holmes' approach to cases involving
economic regulation, where he was prepared to tolerate considerable
legislative interference with existing market arrangements, whether he
approved of the legislation or not.
WHITE, supra note 96, at 413.
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. concludes that Holmes's decision in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), reveals Holmes's preference
for the abstract and the general, and how he blinkered himself to facts about
the real world that were essential to reaching just decisions that would protect
the vulnerable against abuses of power. SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW 65-110 (1976).
99. For examples of largely positive assessments, see LiVA BAKER, THE
JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
(1991); THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 97; David Rosenberg, The Path Not
Taken, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1044 (1997). For examples of largely negative
assessments, see Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1997);
Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1013 (1997).
100. Holmes repeatedly expressed his commitment to this conception:
I have had in mind an ultimate dependence upon science because it is
finally for science to determine, so far as it can, the relative worth of
our different social ends, and, as I have tried to hint, it is our estimate
of the proportion between these, now often blind and unconscious,
that leads us to insist upon and to enlarge the sphere of one principle
and to allow another gradually to dwindle into atrophy. Very likely it
may be that with all the help that statistics and every modem
appliance can bring us there never will be a commonwealth in which
science is everywhere supreme. But it is an ideal, and without ideals
what is life worth?
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This scientific worldview infused Holmes's theory both of
common law and legislative decision-making.1"1 He flatly
rejected the notion that the common law consists of a fixed and
permanent body of precepts that must be applied without regard
to social needs or the relative costs of alternative rules. He
believed that legislative policy-making should be guided by
norms of rational decision-making; legislative goals should be
clearly identified and means to these goals should be selected on
the basis of their relative efficacy and costs. Holmes has been
praised for his early appreciation of the importance of economic
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV. 443,
462 (1899); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 469 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, The Path of the Law].
Philip Wiener relates the various strands in the jurisprudence of Holmes to
his commitment to law as a scientific enterprise:
It was a natural thing for Holmes to admire the positivistic ideas of
[Chauncey] Wright and [Nicholas St. John] Green. Both were eman-
cipated from theology and a priori metaphysics in their discussions of
the fundamental problems and methods of the natural and social sci-
ences, and Holmes saw in their secular naturalism and utilitarian eth-
ics the path of enlightenment in the growth of the law. With Green
and Wright, Holmes accepted the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill
alongside of the nineteenth-century evolutionary historicism of E. B.
Tylor and Sir Henry Maine. Holmes took the analytic method of pre-
Darwinian English positivistic thinkers and the comparative genetic
method of evolution as furnishing the twin keys to law as an evolving
institution and as an anthropological document for the science of
jurisprudence.
PHILIP P. WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 174-75 (1949).
See generally DAVID H. BURTON, PoLrrCAL IDEAS OF JUsTICE HOLMES 22-40
(1992).
101. Holmes wrote:
We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must remember
that for our purposes our only interest in the past is for the light it
throws upon the present. I look forward to a time when the part
played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and
instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of
the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them. As a
step toward that ideal it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an
understanding of economics. The present divorce between the
schools of political economy and law seems to me an evidence of how
much progress in philosophical study still remains to be made. In the
present state of political economy, indeed, we come again upon
history on a larger scale, but there we are called on to consider and
weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, and the
cost. We learn that for everything we have we give up something else,
and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other
advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when we elect.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 100, at 474; see Richard A. Posner, The
Path Away from the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1039 (1997); Rosenberg, supra note
99.
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analysis to legal analysis,' °2 and criticized for the ineptitude of his
effort to construct a science of law from a hodgepodge of vague
economic notions.
10 3
Holmes also believed that science was key to constitutional
jurisprudence. He was heavily influenced by evolutionary sci-
ence and its naturalistic social applications; he believed that the
fundamental story of biological life as well as human intellectual
and social life was the struggle for survival. The "unfit" among
biological creatures, ideas, and social policies would-and
should-be weeded out by evolutionary processes. 104
102. See Posner, supra note 101; Rosenberg, supra note 99.
103. As Richard Parker writes of Holmes's failing:
To reconstruct legal language in service to legal thought, he says that,
first, we must 'know what we are doing.' We must recognize that we
are making 'legislative' choices of policy. Next, we must 'refer' legal
doctrine explicitly to those choices. Finally, we must try to make the
'best' choices. But how? On this point-a crucial point-Holmes
notoriously wobbles. Initially, he just says that we have to 'state in
words' (rather than Morse code?) the 'grounds' for our choices. But
what counts as the best grounds, and why? At times, Holmes uses
words suggesting he has in mind some sort of method to yield the
answers. He describes some policies as 'rational.' He talks of
'show[ing]' whether a policy does 'more good than harm.' He even
says we can aspire to 'prove' or 'discover' which policy is best on
balance, if only for 'here and now.' And he supplements all this with
his famous insistence that lawyers be trained in statistics and
economics. They should, he says, be 'men of science.' And so on.
Where is Holmes-the-'cynic' when we need him? His most 'idealistic'
language-and let's face it-it is vague, obfuscatory, smug language-
begs for a bath in the same 'acid' with which he washed the language of
morality, logic and tradition.
Richard D. Parker, The Mind Of Darkness, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1997)
(citations omitted).
Noonan writes of Holmes's obliviousness to the shortcomings of his
'method':
In later essays, Holmes was sometimes a meliorist and a reformer, and
advocated an approach to law closer to engineering than biology. The
law was to be improved, and improved by measurement. Quantitative
judgments should replace haphazard guessing. What was to be mea-
sured? 'The relative worth of our different social ends.' How was such
worth to be measured? By determining the intensity of our social
desires. Who would determine them? Opinion polls and survey
research were not yet in vogue. The measurement of intensity would
have to be done by 'the great judge,' who accurately appraised the
requirements of the community. That social ends terminate in indi-
vidual persons, that social desires exist in individual persons, was not
observed. Ends or desires were taken globally as forces capable of cal-
culation by the judicial expert.
NOONAN, supra note 98, at 70; see also Tracy E. Higgins, Straying from the Path, 110
HARv. L. REv. 1019 (1997) (applying a feminist critique to Holmes's method).
104. Wiener writes of the influences on Holmes's thinking:
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Domination by virtue of superior power, in Holmes's positiv-
ist take on the law, provided the normative standard by which the
Court in its constitutional jurisprudence should assess outcomes
of the legislative process. Opinions of the justices about the mer-
its of legislative enactments should play no role in determining
their constitutionality. Hence, Holmes famously admonished his
colleagues for their activism in Lochner v. New York,1°5 writing in
dissent that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."' 6 However persuaded Holmes
might be by Spencer's claims, deference to the outcome of the
evolutionary process was what constitutional jurisprudence
demanded: "Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that
the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion . "..."107
Holmes's scientific worldview explains the apparent contra-
dictions in his jurisprudence. He was aligned at times with
progressives, at other times with conservatives, depending upon
his interpretation of his outcome of the social evolutionary strug-
gle. He supported individual rights if they contributed to the
evolutionary process that would weed out "unfit" ideas, while
turning a cold shoulder to the demands of the weak for protec-
tion against the powerful-the assertion of dominance by the
powerful was the way of evolution. He espoused a utilitarianism
that would incorporate the science of economics and statistics in
Holmes shared with [Chauncey] Wright an Emersonian conception of
a wisdom in nature's evolutionary processes, even when they appear to
be most ruthless in eliminating the unfit.... Wright's view of the
economic side of the class struggle for survival in society probably
influenced Holmes, who lived through sixty years more of the growing
industrial strife of our modem United States. .... Holmes regularly
argued against adopting a socialistic program which ignored the cost
of a revolutionary overthrow of the system of private property....
Holmes went so far, however, as to say that if the public mind ever
evolved to the point where it wanted socialism, he would vote and
fight legally against it, but would accept it only if the public force
prevailed in a majority show of strength. The "social Darwinism" of
Holmes appeared in his Malthusian critique of socialism: 'I believe
that Malthus was right in his fundamental notion, and that is as far as
we have got or are likely to get in my day. Every society is founded on
the death of men.... I shall think socialism begins to be entitled to
serious treatment when and not before it takes life in hand and
prevents the continuance of the unfit.'
WIENER, supra note 100, at 176-77 (quoting letter from Holmes to Dr. Ching-
Hsiung Wu, July 21, 1925).
105. 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
106. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 76.
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policymaking, and he wrote as a poet, seized by a vision of law as
pure science.
Holmes's scientific worldview also underwrote his enthusi-
asm for Virginia's involuntary sterilization statute. As Holmes
wrote to a correspondent concerning his decision in Buck v. Bell:
I wrote and delivered a decision upholding the constitu-
tionality of a state law for sterilizing imbeciles the other
day-and felt that I was getting near to the first principle
of real reform. I say merely getting near. I don't mean
that the surgeon's knife is the ultimate symbol.108
Here was a legislative measure that was the product of the evolu-
tionary legislative struggle, that enlisted the claims of science and
the knife of the surgeon in furtherance of the evolutionary bio-
logical struggle, and that plainly satisfied any utilitarian
calculus-demanding only "lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be
such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped
with incompetence.""1 9 It is no wonder that Holmes welcomed
the opportunity to write the decision. As Holmes wrote to a cor-
respondent, "[o] ne decision that I wrote gave me pleasure, estab-
lishing the constitutionality of a law permitting the sterilization
of imbeciles." 110
108. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski, (May 12,
1927), in 2 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLDJ. LASKi,
1916-1935, supra note 96, at 942.
109. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
110. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (May 19,
1927), in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETrRRs: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN, 1903-1935, at 267 (James Bishop Peabody ed.,
1964).
Holmes mentioned the decision and its aftermath in several letters. In a
letter to Harold Laski, Holmes wrote "[t]hat which was given to me Saturday
evening and was written yesterday concerned the constitutionality of an act for
sterilizing feeble-minded people, with due precaution-as to which my lad tells
me the religious are astir. I have just sent what I think to the printer." Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski, (Apr. 25, 1927), in 2 THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LAssi, 1916-1935,
supra note 96, at 937-38.
And in a letter to Laski a few days later, he wrote:
I have had some rather interesting cases-the present one, as I believe
I mentioned, on the Constitutionality of the Virginia act for the
sterilizing of imbeciles, which I believe is a burning theme. In most
cases the difficulty is rather with the writing than with the thinking.
To put the case well and from time to time to hint at a vista is the job.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to HaroldJ. Laski (Apr. 29, 1927), in id. at
938-39.
Several months later, Holmes wrote to Laski:
Cranks as usual do not fail. One letter yesterday told me that I was a
monster and might expect the judgment of an outraged God for a
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In Holmes's jurisprudence, law was an exercise in social sci-
entific mastery over the conduct of human social affairs, and
eugenics was an exercise in scientific and surgical mastery over
the conduct of human reproductive affairs, all for the purpose of
advancing human welfare along the path of evolution. Holmes
never paused to question the goals of the eugenics program. It
was obvious to him that the evolutionary struggle would favor the
intelligent and socially adept-that is, people like him.
So it is not surprising that Holmes never paused to consider
whether the scientific evidence in Buck v. Bell might be suspect,
whether Carrie Buck should enjoy reproductive rights, or
whether a legislative program of eugenics might be an illegiti-
mate exercise of state power. His scientific worldview reduced
the issues surrounding Carrie Buck and her family to a problem
of human pest control and its surgical implementation, an emi-
nently soluble problem given the partnership of modem science
and modern scientific jurisprudence. His commitment to the sci-
entific worldview was as thoroughly unscientific as any blind faith
could be: incautious, unreflective, incurious and unreceptive to
challenges posed from outside the faith.
The exercise in Baconian reflexivity in the case of Buck v.
Bell happened to be an instance of forced sterilization pursuant
to a coercive, governmentally sanctioned program of eugenics.
But science and technology are the willing servants of any who
have the capacity to employ them. And many others may well
share the scientific worldview that led Holmes and the others
involved in Buck v. Bell to conclude that they knew what kinds of
people there should be and that they were justified in imple-
menting their judgments.
IV. GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND THE LEGACY OF BUCK v. BELL
I consider next a potential new exercise in scientific and
technological mastery over humankind: the practice of genetic
enhancement. My goal is twofold: to develop my claim that the
decision that a law allowing the sterilization of imbeciles was constitu-
tional and for the part that I had taken in other decisions that were
dragging the country down.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to HaroldJ. Laski (July 23, 1927), in id. at
964.
Holmes mentioned the decision in his correspondence with Felix Frank-
furter as well, "I think my cases this term have been of rather a high average of
interest, e.g., the Virginia Sterilizing Act." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes
to Felix Frankfurter (May 14, 1927), in HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR COR-
RESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 212 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston
eds., 1996).
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application of science and technology to exercise control over
what kinds of people there should be is indeed wrongful; and to
show that the practice of genetic enhancement is such an exer-
cise in Baconian reflexivity and, hence, its restriction should be
part of the legacy of Buck v. BelL
Advances in genetic science and technology in the twenty-
first century may well give us the power to alter the genetic con-
stitutions of our children through genetic engineering, whether
to cure or forestall disease or to "enhance" human features.'11
Genetic enhancements might include "cosmetic enhance-
111. Genetic engineering, as used here, refers to altering the genetic
constitution of the human body. Genetic engineering may be accomplished
through germ-line therapy, by alteration of the genetic constitution of the
gametes or sex cells of the parents of a future human being or by alteration of
all of the cells of the pre-embryo. Germ-line engineering thus assures that,
absent future interventions, the genetic constitution of the human target of the
genetic engineering will be altered, as will the genetic constitution of all the
children of that target. This is so because every cell, including the sex cells of
that individual, will incorporate the genetic alteration. Genetic engineering
also may be accomplished by somatic cell therapy by which selected cells of a
developing fetus, child, or adult are targeted for the insertion of new genetic
material that is incorporated into the cells and affects their functioning
thereafter.
Germ-line engineering, by its nature, must be performed before a child is
born. Somatic cell therapy theoretically could be performed at any time from
conception to death.
Genetic engineering, whether germ-line or somatic cell, may be performed
for two different purposes. The first purpose is to cure or prevent disease,
disfigurement, or disability. This is called "genetic therapy." The second
purpose is to enhance appearance or functions that fall within the normal
range for the human species. This is called "genetic enhancement."
There are ongoing efforts at somatic cell genetic therapy. The practice is
relatively uncontroversial; concerns center chiefly upon its safety and efficacy.
Somatic cell genetic enhancement is not now possible and the possibility of
engaging in the practice in the future has not received much attention to date.
Germ-line genetic therapy and germ-line genetic enhancement are not
now possible. The possibility of engaging in these practices in the future is
controversial for two reasons. First, some question the ethical propriety of
altering the human germ-line. Second, some question the ethical propriety of
engaging in germ-line genetic therapy or germ-line genetic enhancement if
these practices would be performed in conjunction with the practice of in vitro
fertilization (some question the ethical propriety of in vitro fertilization under
all circumstances, others under circumstances that involve the destruction of
embryos or the implantation of numerous embryos in anticipation of reduction
abortion).
Germ-line genetic enhancement is also controversial for additional reasons
explored in this article. See generally LEROY WALTERS & JULIE GAGE PALMER, THE
ETHICS OF HUMAN GENE THERAPY (1997); JEFF LYON & PETER CORNER, ALTERED
FATES: GENE THERAPY AND THE RETOOLING OF HUMAN LIFE (1995); EVE K.
NICHOLS, HuMAN GEN THERAPY (1988).
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ments"-altering aspects of physical appearance such as height,
eye color, facial features, and so on. Also possible might be
"capabilities enhancement"-altering faculties such as intelli-
gence, strength, agility, and so on. Third, "behavioral enhance-
ment"-altering predispositions to display traits such as
kindness, empathy, gentleness, or a particular sexual orienta-
tion-also might be possible; although this remains the most sci-
entifically dubious.
Imagine now, a state of affairs in which we have good reason
to believe that we can safely and effectively engage in genetic
enhancement. Our scientific theories are well supported by
observational and experimental evidence and there is a wide and
deep consensus in the scientific community that these theories
are true or at least approximately true. In addition, we have
developed our technical expertise through repeated and success-
ful genetic enhancements of animals. Imagine also that the
regime of constitutionally protected reproductive rights in force
is roughly the same as that which prevails today. And imagine,
finally, that enactment of a coercive, governmentally sanctioned
program of eugenics employing genetic enhancement technol-
ogy is unthinkable. The political and social consensus is roughly
the same as that which prevails today and it precludes any realis-
tic possibility of enacting such a program.
I note two important points about this imagined state of
affairs. First, the conditions I have specified would foreclose the
possibility of recurrence of the three wrongs constitutive of our
current understanding of the legacy of Buck v. Bell. Second, the
state of affairs I have characterized constitutes my best guess as to
the actual state of affairs that will prevail in the not-too-distant
future.
Given this assumed state of affairs, I will consider, first, the
potential benefits and harms that might result from the three
potential sorts of genetic enhancement-cosmetic, capabilities,
and behavioral. I will then broaden the scope of my considera-
tion of these practices in support of my claim that they would be
wrongful and that the legacy of Buck v. Bell should include their
restriction.
Assuming that cosmetic enhancement were safe and effec-
tive, that our society continued its commitment to a strong
regime of reproductive rights, and that parents were not coerced
to engage in the practice-all assumptions included in our
imagined state of affairs-there appears to be no obvious reason
why the practice should be restricted. Achieving an improved
appearance is widely considered a positive accomplishment. We
encourage efforts to improve appearance, as by developing good
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grooming practices, and cosmetic surgeries aimed at improving
appearance are very popular among those who can afford them.
Although the scope of reproductive rights might be contro-
versial with respect to certain parental decisions, such as those in
connection with abortion, the decision to enhance one's off-
spring so as to improve their appearance would not appear to
present similar concerns.' 12 Parents now are free to engage in
reproductive conduct that affects the appearance of their chil-
dren-by their selection of mates or of donated gametes, in the
case of assisted reproduction. Parents also are free to make
grooming and clothing determinations for young children, and
parental influence in these matters may well persist throughout
children's lifetimes.
Concerns might arise, however, with respect to parental
choices that do not appear to serve the best interests of their
children. For example, some parents now arrange for their chil-
dren to receive injections of human growth hormone to increase
their stature. Some commentators suggest that it is ethically
wrong to submit a child to a painful series of shots because of
parents' unwarranted concerns about the future stature of the
child." 3 Perhaps we should be similarly concerned that parents
might cosmetically enhance their children due to unwarranted
parental concerns about the adequacy of their children's
appearance.
There is always the risk that well-intended parental interven-
tions may do more harm than good, however. Cosmetic
enhancement would not appear to introduce any novel concerns
in this sense, just a novel context within which the benefits and
harms of intervention would have to be sorted out. It is not obvi-
ous on its face that these interventions-which, unlike injections
of human growth hormone, would involve no physical pain and
which, we have assumed, would be safe and effective-would
always or usually do more harm than good. In fact, it seems
112. See articles generally favoring permitting genetic enhancements and
asserting that the practice should fall within the scope of protected
reproductive rights: JONATHON GLOVER, WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE SHOULD THERE
BE? (1984); John Harris, Is Gene Therapy a Form of Eugenics? 7 BIOETHICS 178
(1993); Ronald Munson & Lawrence H. Davis, Germ-Line Gene Therapy and the
Medical Imperative, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 137 (1992); David Resnick,
Debunking the Slippery Slope Argument Against Human Germ-line Gene Therapy, 19 J.
MED. & PHIL. 23 (1994).
113. For a thoughtful discussion of the issues involved in the
administration of human growth hormone therapy, see GLENN McGEE, THE
PERFECr BABY: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO GENETICS (1997).
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likely, given the value we place upon appearance, that these
interventions generally would accomplish more good than harm.
But what of parents whose motivations were plainly self-cen-
tered rather than well-intended, as revealed, for example, by
eccentric cosmetic enhancements that made their child appear
ridiculous or offensive to others? In this case, again, cosmetic
enhancement would appear to introduce no novel issues. Some
parents are more self-centered than others and their parenting
choices of all sorts will reflect this fact. We police parental con-
duct of this sort at the margins by child abuse and child neglect
laws. We could police the margins of cosmetic enhancement as
well, enforcing restrictions through regulation of health care
professionals who perform the enhancement procedures.1 14
There might be two additional concerns peculiar to the con-
text of cosmetic enhancement, however. First, because prefer-
ences in appearance are determined at least in part by changing
social fancies, and because genetic enhancement permanently
alters appearance, the practice might result in self-defeating
cycles that would undermine the ability of parents to make
rational calculations of potential benefits and harms. For exam-
ple, just as a large cohort of girls-engineered to be the unobjec-
tionable and hence cosmetically preferred height of 5 feet 8
inches tall-came to maturity, socially preferred heights for girls
might change, in part in response to the very abundance of girls
of 5 feet 8 inches in height.
Second, genetic enhancement would enable parents to alter
features we have identified as distinctive to racial groups. What if
it were the case that future parents of children of color deter-
mined that their children's best interests, measured by life
opportunities within our society for the foreseeable future, would
best be served by engineering lighter skin?115 The availability of
cosmetic enhancement technology might present caring parents
with choices they would prefer not to have.
Perhaps these concerns are far-fetched though. The risk of
self-defeating cycles would be unlikely, and even if they occurred,
the magnitude of the resulting harm likely would not be great.
And parental interventions to alter racial features likely would be
uncommon given the value placed upon identification with
114. See discussion favoring restrictions that assure that enhancements
do not limit the range of opportunities available to a child in Nicholas Agar,
Designing Babies: Morally Permissible Ways to Modify the Human Genome, 9 BIOETHICs
1 (1995).
115. There are anecdotal reports of such choices in gamete donor cases.
See GINA MARANTO, QUEST FOR PERFECTION: THE DRIVE TO BREED BETTER HuMAN
BEINGs 270 (1996).
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racial and ethnic communities. So these particular concerns do
not obviously outweigh the potential benefits of cosmetic
enhancement.
Genetic enhancement directed at enhancing capabilities-
faculties or abilities such as intelligence, strength, or agility-
would pose a different set of questions. At the outset, it would
appear that capabilities enhancement would hold the prospect of
providing far more benefits than cosmetic enhancement.
Unlike preferences for enhanced appearance, preferences
for enhanced capabilities presumably would not reflect passing
social fancies; any child in any time or place and pursuing any
life plan would benefit from enhanced capabilities. Further-
more, capabilities enhancement presumably would yield positive
social consequences; enhanced individuals would be more likely
to make enhanced contributions to society.
Perhaps, then, we would not only tolerate capabilities
enhancement, but encourage it, just as we encourage education
because every child benefits from an education and all of society
benefits from the "positive externalities" that accrue from edu-
cated citizens. Perhaps parents who failed to obtain such
enhancements for their children would be considered guilty of
neglect, as with parents who fail to ensure that their children
obtain an adequate education. In fact, it might be appropriate to
fund equal access to these enhancements so that parents could
satisfy their obligations.
In might also be necessary to fund equal. access-both as a
matter of fairness and to avoid the social tension that would
result if equal access were not funded.' 16 It is one thing to watch
the well-to-do send their children to private schools in private
cars while one's own ride the public school buses to public
schools-we still believe there remains the chance to cultivate
our children's talents such that they can compete well and con-
tribute to society. But it would be quite another thing to see the
well-to-do enjoy a bump-up in talent before they even crossed the
thresholds of their private schools.
Thus, the importance and value of capabilities enhancement
would appear to recommend government subsidization. Presum-
ably, this governmental involvement would be viewed positively,
as with the subsidization of educational opportunities, rather
than as an unwelcome return to a governmentally sanctioned
program of eugenics. Every child would be entitled to basic
capabilities enhancement just as every child now is entitled to a
116. See the working out of the fair distribution argument in Resnick,
supra note 112.
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basic education. With this subsidization in place, one or two gen-
erations of parents might preside over the genetic redesign of
our species-or our successor species-just as earlier generations
presided over the universalization of education.
There might be some concerns, though, about the social
consequences of this redesign. To this point, the natural distri-
bution of various capabilities has led some to certain lines of
work, and others to different lines of work, subject to the vagaries
of family and social circumstance and of luck. The results of an
artificially contrived distribution of capabilities might mean that
all positions would have to be determined by these vagaries since
everyone might be nearly equal in their capabilities. Or we
might institute a lottery to determine who, among the equally
well-endowed intellects and athletes, for example, would be
granted the opportunity to work in academia or on the playing
field. Or perhaps parents would tailor the capabilities of their
children in distinctive ways reflecting their personal preferences
or their sense of thejob market, or in accordance with a national
plan establishing what sorts of workers were needed.
Perhaps, though, we should reexamine our initial assump-
tion that enhanced intelligence, strength, and the like would be
undeniably valuable. What if there is no all-purpose set of capa-
bilities that in fact is likely to improve everyone's experience of
life and to yield benefits to society as well?
The connection between a person's ability to lead a good
life-as measured by happiness, success, or any other concep-
tion-and a set of capabilities-such as intelligence, memory,
strength, or agility-is anything but obvious. Only if we limit our
conception of the good life to a life lived with enhanced capabili-
ties or a life lived with an abundance of that which enhanced
capabilities enables us to attain, whatever that might be, must we
conclude that the connection is secure. It is true that, intuitively,
we believe there must be a connection. But this is likely because
we now associate high-status jobs and social position with certain
capabilities or with that which these capabilities enable their
bearers to attain. But, for example, athletes have not always been
so well paid and widely admired. Just as with personal appear-
ance, the value we attach to capabilities is, at least in part, a mat-
ter of passing fancy.
And the connection between capabilities enhancement and
the improvement of our society is not obviously true either. The
assumption that those who possess enhanced capabilities will
contribute something more and better than those who do not is
deeply problematic. The havoc wrought by a few bright minds-
despots and criminals, as well as reformers and utopians-must
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exceed, by any measure, the trivial costs imposed upon their fel-
lows by those who cannot read or walk. Whether a society of the
many bright minds would be a better society or even a good soci-
ety is at least an open question. To raise these issues more con-
cretely, as between Justice Holmes and Carrie Buck, who led the
better life? Who brought a greater measure of good than harm
to the world?
Although capabilities enhancement would appear at first
blush to be more likely to yield net benefit than cosmetic
enhancement, on closer examination it appears to introduce
more nettlesome concerns-concerns not easily dismissed as far-
fetched. The last sort of genetic enhancement-behavioral
enhancement-raises more and different concerns.
The prospect of behavioral enhancement arouses considera-
ble controversy, first, because the nature of the link between
genetic endowment and behavior is hotly contested, and, second,
because the determination that there is a strong link could have
important implications for our conception of ourselves as beings
who make choices and deserve judgments of merit and blame.117
If indeed we developed the ability to work significant changes in
behavioral traits by genetic enhancement technology, the contro-
versy regarding free will and culpability would expand
exponentially. 18
But these concerns are a bit abstract, more the concerns of
philosophers than parents. We might conclude that, if we could
develop the power to improve the behavioral traits of our chil-
dren, parents surely would want to do so, and surely should be
encouraged to do so. The benefits to children and the world if
parents engineered their children to be kind, empathic, and gen-
tle could be enormous.
But would caring parents in our imagined state of affairs, a
state of affairs much like that which prevails at present, choose to
engineer for this set of behavioral traits? Kindness might slow
the combative reflexes, empathy offers no benefit in a fight, and
gentleness invites overreaching by others.
It is hard to know. We are accustomed to the age-old dialec-
tic of parental efforts to influence the behavior of their children,
117. While the scientific feasibility of engineering polygenic features,
such as intelligence, involving a strong environmental influence is debatable,
the feasibility of engineering dispositions, such as kindness, altruism, or
generosity, is far more dubious both because of uncertainty about the nature of
the genetic contribution to these dispositions and because of the undeniable
importance of environment in the development of these features. See generally
WALTERS & PALMER, supra note 111.
118. See generally sources cited supra note 112.
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met by intractable resistance and unanticipated consequences,
followed by parental efforts reconceived, met by resistance recon-
ceived and modest movement. If parents were granted the
power to realize their fantasy, to order up children predisposed
to the behavioral traits their parents thought best for them, what
would they choose? And what would be the consequences for
them, their children, and society?
To this point, we have marshaled arguments about the bene-
fits and harms that might accrue from the voluntary practice of
genetic enhancement. These arguments are inconclusive; rea-
sonable people could disagree about whether the practice would
yield, on balance, benefit or harm for children, their parents, or
society. Given that we cannot establish an excess of harm over
benefit, and given our assumed commitment to reproductive
rights in our imaginary state of affairs, it would appear that those
favoring the liberty to engage in the practice would prevail.
But we have not yet considered all of the arguments for the
wrongfulness of the practice, although our consideration of ben-
efits and harms has raised questions and concerns that direct us
toward these arguments. Our discussion to this point has cen-
tered upon considerations that typically might arise in discus-
sions of dog breeding, for example, or the breeding of other
domestic animals. What sort of coat, hunting skills, and tempera-
ment would we prefer, all things considered?
We are accustomed to addressing these sorts of questions in
connection with animals-we have long considered them appro-
priate subjects for the exercise of mastery for human benefit-
but to consider these questions in connection with our future
children is unsettling. Perhaps our discomfort is due simply to
our unfamiliarity with the practice. But perhaps our discomfort
is connected to deeper concerns about ethical limits to the con-
trol we should assert over other human beings in pursuit of our
judgments of the way they should be.
We now see children as given and nurtured, not designed
and bred, whether given by nature or God or a birth mother
handing over a child for adoption. If we engage in the practice
of genetic enhancement, our children would join the rest of the
natural world as subjects of our assertions of mastery, reflecting
our determinations of what kinds of people there should be as
we now determine what kinds of sheep, houses, and airplanes
there should be.
We might well arrive at a view of what kinds of people there
should be that is as largely standardized as are our conceptions of
sheep and houses and airplanes. Or we might come to delight in
THE UNSETFLED LEGACY OF BUCK v. BELL
breeding exotica. It is difficult to predict given our limited expe-
rience with assimilating our children to all the other constituents
of the natural world that we now survey through Baconian sights.
Engaging in genetic therapy to relieve suffering or cure or
prevent disease or disability surely is consistent with our current
shared conception of our children. There is in this motivation
no presumption that we are entitled to assert mastery over them
to work an improvement in their design. Although the line
between genetic therapy and genetic enhancement may appear
perilously difficult to define and enforce, it is a line that is real.
It is the line between compassion and hubris, between respecting
the autonomy and worth of other human beings and regarding
others as suitable subjects for our evaluation and "improvement."
We see in Buck v. Bell the decision of a person who was
utterly devoid of compassion and respect for another human
being. This failing is not unique to Holmes, and exercises in
Baconian reflexivity are not the only occasions for display of this
failing, as contemplation of any of the judicial decisions that we
recognize as horrendously wrong reveals. But in constructing
the legacy of Buck v. Bell, we have an opportunity to learn from
Holmes.
In the new genetic era, the Baconian temptation will be diffi-
cult to resist. The promise of improvement through science is
very real-the twentieth century, in particular, has brought enor-
mous advances in our capacity to relieve suffering and to cure
and prevent disease and disability. Why not focus our concern,
then, upon maximizing the potential benefits of genetic
enhancement and minimizing the potential harms?
The importance of our liberty to procreate also is very real-
the thought of coercive governmental intrusion upon this liberty,
whether to accomplish eugenic goals or any other goals, is imme-
diately and profoundly offensive. Why not extend this procrea-
tive liberty, then, to encompass the right to enhance our
offspring, subject to limits aimed at minimizing potential harms?
But we have decided in other contexts-contexts in which
some of us otherwise would have the power to impose our
choices upon others of us-that we must impose-limits upon the
exercise of that power. Employers are not free to engage in sex-
ual harassment of their employees, parents are not free to
neglect their children, spouses are not free to abuse their
spouses. Science cannot instruct us on what these limits should
be, and the language of constitutional rights and interests cap-
tures only one dimension of our reproductive lives. We must
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decide whether to impose limits upon the power we may exercise
in our reproductive lives to determine the genetic constitutions
of our children. We can find guidance on this question in the
legacy of Buck v. Bell.
